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CASE COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY LAW-THE STANDARD FOR REJECTING COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY: LABOR DISCOVERS IT AIN'T
"NECESSARILY" So
Since July 10, 1984, 11 U.S.C. § 11131 has governed the rejection of
collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy.2 Section 1113 provides
debtors with an expedited negotiation process for modifying a burden-
some organized labor contract.3 In the event that this negotiation pro-
cess fails, section 1113 allows for a judicial evaluation of a petition for
I II U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. III 1985).
2 Bankruptcy law has two alternative goals: reorganization and liquidation. Kennedy, Creative
Bankruptcy: Use and Abuse of the Bankruptcy Law--Reflections on Some Recent Cases, 71 IOWA L. REV. 199,
201 (1985). Reorganization, the rehabilitation of a debtor through a collective agreement of its
creditors, is the preferred goal of bankruptcy law. It intends to prevent economic waste, since "as-
sets that are used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable
than those same assets sold for scrap." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6179. Congress enacted § 1113 to provide a special
standard for rejection of collective bargaining agreements. The drafters envisioned that its pre-
rejection negotiation procedure would prevent economic waste associated either with liquidation or
renegotiation of collective bargaining agreements and would properly balance bankruptcy's goal of
reorganization against labor's interests in stable contractual relations reached through collective bar-
gaining. T. HAGGARD & M. PULLIAM, CONFLICTS BETWEEN LABOR LEGISLATION AND BANKRUPTcY LAW
3-6 (1987).
3 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (Supp. III 1985) provides in relevant part:
(a) The debtor in possession, or the trustee if one has been appointed under the
provisions of this chapter... may assume or reject a collective bargaining agreement only
in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking rejec-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement, the debtor in possession or trustee (hereinafter in
this 'section 'trustee' shall include a debtor in possession), shall
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees cov-
ered by such agreement, based on the most complete and reliable information available at
the time of such proposal, which provides for those necessary modifications in the em-
ployee benefits and protections that are necessary to permit reorganization of the debtor
and assures that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably; and
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the employees
with such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
(2) During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal provided
for in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing provided for in subsection
(d)(1), the trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized representative to
confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of such
agreement.
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement only if the court finds that
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the require-
ments of subsection (b)(1);
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept such pro-
posal without good cause; and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement....
(e) If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in effect,
and if essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or in order to avoid irreparable
damage to the estate, the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee to
implement interim changes in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules pro-
vided by a collective bargaining agreement. Any hearing under this paragraph shall be
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rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.4 However, pursuant to
section 11 13(b)(1), the modifications proposed during negotiations must
be "necessary to permit reorganization" in order to warrant later judicial
rejection.5 The Second Circuit's recent decision in Truck Drivers Local
807 v. Carey Transportation, Inc. 6 has divided the circuits by formulating a
more lenient standard for "necessary modifications" than that adopted in
Wheeling-PittsburghSteel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America.7 In particular,
the Carey court held that "necessary modifications" mean not only those
absolutely minimal changes intended to forestall liquidation, as in the
Wheeling standard,8 but also any modifications that promote the long-
term reorganization of the debtor.9
Part I of this case comment briefly sketches the development of the
controversy surrounding the interpretation of section 1113. Part II out-
lines the decision of the Third Circuit in Wheeling, in terms of the court's
scheduled in accordance with the needs of the trustee. The implementation of such interim
changes shall not render the application for rejection moot.
(0 No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a trustee to unilaterally ter-
minate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement prior to compliance with
the provisions of this section.
4 The mechanics of the § 1113 process were addressed in an early decision interpreting the
section, In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984), which set forth a nine-
part test for rejection of collective bargaining agreements pursuant to § 1113. The test is as follows:
1) The debtor in possession must make a proposal to the Union to modify the collec-
tive bargaining agreement;
2) The proposal must be based on the most complete and reliable information avail-
able at the time of the proposal;
3) The proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor;
4) The proposed modifications must assure that all creditors, the debtor and all of the
affected parties are treated fairly and equitably;
5) The debtor must provide to the Union such relevant information as is necessary to
evaluate the proposal;
6) Between the time of the making of the proposal and the time of the hearing on
approval of the rejection of the existing collective bargaining agreement, the debtor must
meet at reasonable times with the Union;
7) At the meetings the debtor must confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutu-
ally satisfactory modifications of the collective bargaining agreement;
8) The Union must have refused to accept the proposal without good cause;
9) The balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the collective bargaining
agreement.
44 Bankr. at 909.
5 Several courts have interpreted the phrase "necessary modifications." See Truck Drivers Lo-
cal 807 v. Carey Transportation, Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 88-90 (2d Cir. 1987); In re Century Brass Prod-
ucts, Inc., 795 F.2d 265, 273-76 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 433 (1986); Wheeling-Pittsburgh
Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 791 F.2d 1074, 1084-91 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Royal
Composing Room, Inc., 62 Bankr. 403, 412, 417-18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) aff'd - Bankr.-
(S.D.N.Y Sept. 29, 1987) (No. 86 Civ. 4849 (JFK)); In re Amherst Sparkle Market, Inc., 75 Bankr.
847, 851 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); In re Walway Co., 69 Bankr. 967, 973-75 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1987); In re Mile Hi Metal Systems, Inc., 67 Bankr. 114, 117-19 (D. Colo. 1986); In re William
Brogna, Inc., 64 Bankr. 390, 392-93 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Kentucky Truck Sale, Inc., 52
Bankr. 797, 800-02 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); In re Valley Kitchens, Inc., 52 Bankr. 493, 495-97
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985); In re Cook United, Inc., 50 Bankr. 561, 563-65 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In
re Allied Delivery System Co., 49 Bankr. 700, 701-02 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); In re Salt Creek
Freightways, 47 Bankr. 835, 837-38 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1985); In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr.
907, 909-11 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).
6 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
7 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
8 Id. at 1088-89.
9 816 F.2d at 90.
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two-part analysis that asks, under section 1113, "how necessary" modifi-
cations must be, and "necessary to what." 10 Part III then describes how
the Carey court uses the Wheeling two-part analysis to arrive at a more
lenient understanding of the "necessary" modifications requirement.
Part IV proceeds to examine the Carey and Wheeling holdings in terms of
the legal authorities they rely upon and the precision of the standards
they proffer. In so doing, it suggests that courts shou'ld limit proposals
which are "necessary to permit reorganization" under section 1113 to
those that significantly increase the likelihood of reorganization of the
debtor despite the cumulative effect of.other cost-saving measures. Fi-
nally, Part V supports this reading of section 1113 by noting that the
repetitive use of the word "necessary" in the statute confines section
1113 proposals to those types of modifications that result in direct sav-
ings to the debtors.
I. Development of the Controversy Surrounding the Necessary
Modification Issue
A. Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements as Executory Contracts
To facilitate reorganization in a Chapter 11 proceeding," section
365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the rejection of executory
contracts by a reorganizing debtor. 12 Prior to the enactment of section
1113 in 1984, courts generally considered collective bargaining agree-
ments to be executory contracts which could be rejected under section
365(a) or its predecessor, section 313.13 However, before the Supreme
10 791 F.2d at 1088.
11 The Chapter 11 remedy allows a debtor to file a petition for relief with a United States Bank-
ruptcy Court and thereby obtain an automatic stay free of creditor litigation in order to permit the
debtor to reorganize by selling assets, borrowing money, or changing methods of operation. 11
U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The debtor also prepares a plan of reorganization which must
promise creditors at least as much payment as they would receive upon a company liquidation. Id. at
§ 1123. If the reorganization plan meets statutory standards, the court will confirm it and it will
become binding upon all company creditors. Id. at § 1129. For additional discussion of the Chapter
11 process, see COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 20.1 at 246-249 (1986 ed.).
12 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (Supp. III 1985) states that "[e]xcept as provided in Sections 765 and 766
of this title and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's
approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." For bank-
ruptcy purposes, an executory contract has been defined as a contract "on which performance re-
mains due to some extent on both sides." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963. The significance of § 365 is this: by
rejecting an unfavorable contract, the debtor is able to transform a full contractual obligation into a
judgment obligation for damages. Such ajudgment obligation must then compete with the claims of
other unsecured creditors and will in all likelihood receive only partial payment. Thus, through
rejection, the debtor is able to decrease its liabilities and increase its worth, thereby benefiting its
creditors and bettering its chances for a successful reorganization. For additional discussion, see T.
JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPrcY LAW 108, 108-110 (1986); Note, Bankruptcy and the
Union's Bargain: Equitable Treatment of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1015, 1029-30
(1987).
13 See, e.g., In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 78 (3d Cir. 1982), aff'd sub nona. N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984); Borman's Inc. v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 706 F.2d 187, 190 n.8 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908 (1983); Local Joint Executive Board, AFL-CIO v. Hotel Circle, Inc.,
613 F.2d 210, 212-14 (9th Cir. 1980); Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc.,
519 F.2d 698, 706 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Klaber Brothers, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
The statutory framework regarding employer-union labor relations is contained in the National La-
bor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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Court's guidance in National Labor Relations Board (N.L.R.B.) v. Bildisco &
Bildisco, 14 there was a split in the circuits as to what standard courts
should apply when considering the possible rejection of an executory
collective bargaining agreement. 15 This split resulted from the tension
between the bankruptcy law policy of protecting company assets and the
labor law policy of encouraging collective bargaining agreements.
Prior to Bildisco and the adoption of section 1113, bankruptcy courts
faced potential conflict between section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code and
section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) when consider-
ing the rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. 16 Whereas sec-
tion 365 allows a debtor to unilaterally reject the terms of executory
contracts, subject to court approval, 17 section 8(d) of the NLRA prohibits
unilateral rejection of collective bargaining agreements and provides
specific guidelines for negotiating agreement changes.18 The tension be-
tween the provisions became manifest when the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (NLRB) sought to enforce judgments for unfair labor
practices against debtors that had rejected collective bargaining agree-
ments with the approval of the bankruptcy court. 19
In an attempt to resolve the labor-bankruptcy conflict, several fed-
eral circuit courts found that the Bankruptcy Code took priority over the
14 465 U.S. 513, 525 (1984). See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text and notes 35-39 and accompanying text. See also
In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 81; Local Union 20 v. Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F.2d 890,
899-900 (11th Cir. 1983).
16 See infra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
17 11 U.S.C. § 365; see supra note 12.
18 Section 8(d) of the NLRA provides a detailed, four-step process for the modification of a
collective bargaining agreement. In relevant part, it provides:
(d) [W]here there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an
industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party
to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such
termination or modification-
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termi-
nation or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such
contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such
termination or modification;
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a
new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after
such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies the State or
Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Terri-
tory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that time;
and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the
terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is
given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later.
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). The remainder of § 8(d), along with § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA (29 U.S.C.
§ 158(c)(5) (1982)), provides that the failure of an employer or labor organization to comply with
these conditions will constitute an unfair labor practice.
19 See, e.g., In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d at 84 (holding that a NLRB order in response to a complaint
of an unfair labor practice failed to recognize the bankruptcy court order permitting rejection of the
collective bargaining agreement in reorganization and thus would not be enforced by the Court of
Appeals); Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 704 (holding that until the debtor in bankruptcy assumes the old
agreement or makes a new one, it is not subject to the termination restriction imposed by § 8(d) of
the NLRA); and REA Express, 523 F.2d at 167-68 (citing Kevin Steel that absent a clear Congressional
mandate to the contrary, the enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement must yield to the
bankruptcy court's power to provide relief for the debtor in bankruptcy).
[Vol. 63:79
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NLRA.20 But, rather than render the NLRA meaningless in this context,
these courts tried to balance the labor law and bankruptcy policies. 2' As
a result, different judicial standards for the rejection of collective bar-
gaining agreements emerged, although all federal circuit courts agreed
that the standard should be more stringent than the business judgment
test that governed other contract rejections. 22 The courts eventually
came to apply an elaborate "balance of equities" test that weighed non-
economic as well as traditional business judgment factors to determine if
a collective bargaining agreement could be rejected. 23
1. Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first to address this
conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and the NLRA. In Shopmen's Local
Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc.,24 the Second Circuit, in permit-
ting rejection of the collective bargaining agreement, discussed the
proper standard for evaluating whether a collective bargaining agree-
ment should be rejected. 25 It ultimately adopted a standard first enunci-
ated in In Re Overseas National Airways,26 which required "thorough
scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities on both sides" in deter-
mining whether an executory collective bargaining agreement could be
rejected in bankruptcy.27 The Second Circuit stressed that "[t]he deci-
20 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522-23 (1984); Brada Miller, 702 F.2d at
896-97 (11th Cir. 1983); See also Note, supra note 12, at 1030.
21 See, e.g., Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 524-27 (stressing that the natural labor policies of avoiding labor
strife and encouraging collective bargaining require that employers and unions reach their own
agreements on terms and conditions of employment free from governmental interference, but that
the policy of Chapter 11 is to permit successful rehabilitation of debtors, and hence rejection of
collective bargaining agreements may be permitted if that policy would be served by such action).
22 The business judgment test provided that a debtor could reject the agreement when in the
business judgment of the trustee or management, the estate would be burdened to the extent that
assets could not be conserved. See, e.g., In re Gray Truck Line Co., 34 Bankr. 174 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1983). See also Ritchey, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements: Section 1113, 4 BANKR. DEv.J. 171,
171 (1987). In the collective bargaining context, such a rule was thought to grant management too
much power by allowing companies to use bankruptcy law as a means of evading their collective
bargaining obligations; hence, a stricter standard was deemed necessary. See, e.g., Bildisco, 465 U.S.
at 523 ("Although there is no indication in § 365 ... that rejection of collective bargaining agree-
ments should be governed by a standard different from that governing other execut6ry contracts, all
of the Courts of Appeals which have considered the matter have concluded that the standard should
be a stricter one.") (citing Brada-Miller, 702 F.2d 890 (11 th Cir. 1983); In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d
Cir. 1982); Hotel Circle, 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980); Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975)).
23 See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
24 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
25 The union had filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB against Kevin Steel for vio-
lating § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by, among other things, allegedly refusing to sign a new collective
bargaining agreement. Shortly thereafter, the company filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Act. The NLRB found Kevin Steel guilty of unfair labor practices and ordered it to
sign the collective bargaining agreement. The company successfully moved to reject the agreement
in bankruptcy court, but the district court held § 313(1) of the Bankruptcy Act (the forerunner of
§ 365(a)) inapplicable to such agreements and thus denied the rejection. Id. at 700-01. Kevin Steel
then appealed the rejection issue to the Second Circuit.
26 238 F. Supp. 359 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
27 Id. at 361. The rationale for the Overseas standard which the Second Circuit adopted in Kevin
Steel was described as follows:
... [I]n relieving a debtor from its obligations under a collective bargaining agreement, it
may be depriving the employees affected of their seniority, welfare and pension rights, as
well as other valuable benefits which are incapable of forming the basis of a provable claim
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sion to allow rejection should not be based solely on whether it will im-
prove the financial status of the debtor. Such a narrow approach totally
ignores the policies of the Labor Act and makes no attempt to accommo-
date them." 28
2. Tightening the Kevin Steel Standard in Brotherhood of Railway, Airline
and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc.
The Second Circuit modified its Kevin Steel approach in Brotherhood of
Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks v. REA Express, Inc. 29 Whereas Kevin
Steel allowed rejection of a collective bargaining agreement based on a
balancing of the equities, the REA Express standard permitted rejection
only where the executory collective bargaining agreement would "thwart
efforts to save a failing [company] in bankruptcy from collapse .... "30
Thus, REA Express required a showing that the rejection of the agreement
was necessary to prevent the debtor's immediate liquidation.3'
Courts which subsequently relied on REA Express applied a two-step
analysis: first, the collective bargaining agreement must be burdensome
to the extent that failure to reject it would make a successful reorganiza-
tion impossible; and second, the equities must favor the debtor.3 2 How-
ever, a number of courts refused to adopt the stringent REA Express
standard,33 and as a result the Kevin Steel and REA Express conflict over
the appropriate standard for rejection still existed in the circuits until the
Supreme Court considered the issue.
for money damages. That would leave the employees without compensation for their
losses, at the same time enabling the debtor, at the expense of the employees, to consum-
mate what may be a more favorable plan or arrangement with its other creditors.
Id. at 361-62.
28 Kevin Steel, 519 F.2d at 707.
29 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975).
30 Id. at 169. Although the facts of REA Express were distinguishable from Kevin Steel in that REA
Express involved an agreement under the Railway Labor Act, which is expressly excepted under
§ 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Second Circuit did not limit application of the REA Express
rejection standard on this basis. Id. at 168. See also Comment, From Legislation to Consternation: Has
Section 1113 Really Changed Bildisco?, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 167, 174 (1987).
31 REA Express, 523 F.2d at 167-69; See also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPrcy, 11 13.01(3)(d) at 1113-7
(15th ed. 1987); Ritchey, supra note 22 at 171.
32 See, e.g., In re Allen Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 169 (E.D. Pa. 1978), appeal dismissed,
595 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Connecticut Celery Co., 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2847, 2851-53
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1980); In re Penn Fruit Co., 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3548 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re Studio
Eight Lighting, Inc., 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2429, 2430 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
33 See e.g., Brada Miller, 702 F.2d at 899 (stressing that the test of REA Express imposes an exces-
sive burden on the debtor-in-possession); In re Gray Truck Line Co., 34 Bankr. 174, 178 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1983) (rejecting the REA Express standard because it fails to consider the potential conse-
quences of a debtor-in-possession's inability to reject a collective bargaining agreement-the "very
real likelihood of a total destruction of the debtor's chances to reorganize .... ); In re Southern
Electronics Co., 23 Bankr. 348, 358-59 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (arguing that the Kevin Steel stan-
dard, rather than the more stringent standard expressed in REA Express, represents the appropriate
compromise between the competing statutory labor and bankruptcy policies); In re Yellow Limou-
sine Service, Inc., 22 Bankr. 807, 809 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (adopting the Kevin Steel standard as
applied in In re Bildisco, thereby refusing to follow REA Express). The Third Circuit in In re Bildisco
explained its deviation from REA Express, "[F]irst, for the pragmatic reason that it may be impossible
to predict the success vel non of a reorganization until very late in the arrangement proceedings; and
second, for the prudential consideration that the imposition of such a test unduly exalts the perpetu-
ation of the collective bargaining agreement over the more pragmatic consideration of whether the
employees will continue to have jobs at all." 682 F.2d at 80.
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B. N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco: The Supreme Court Enunciates an
"Equitable" Standard for Rejection
The Supreme Court resolved the conflict in the circuits when it en-
dorsed a balancing standard more favorable to a debtor in bankruptcy.
In N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco,34 the Court set forth both the proper
substantive standard to be used by bankruptcy courts asked to approve
rejections of collective bargaining agreements and the procedural pre-
requisites to rejection under section 365(a).
In defining the substantive standard for rejection, the Court refused
to apply the Second Circuit's REA Express standard 35 and instead adopted
the less stringent Kevin Steel balancing test, holding that the debtor need
only prove "that the collective-bargaining agreement burdens the estate,
and that after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of rejecting
the labor contract."'3 6 AlthoughJustice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity, did not elaborate on how the interests of the affected parties should
be balanced, 37 he did indicate that although not every conceivable equity
should be considered, any equity which related to the success of reorgan-
ization was relevant.38
The Court also resolved the conflict between section 365(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act and section 8(d) of the NLRA in its Bildisco decision
through its treatment of the procedural aspect of the rejection question.
The Court held that a debtor in Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings
did not have to engage in collective bargaining before modifying or re-
jecting provisions of the labor agreement, and that such unilateral action
by a debtor prior to formal rejection of the collective bargaining agree-
ment did not constitute an unfair labor practice by virtue of the debtor's
violation of section 8(d) of the NLRA.3 9 Thus, under Bildisco, a debtor
34 465 U.S. 513 (1984). Bildisco & Bildisco, a partnership, had filed for reorganization under
Chapter 11. Bildisco, authorized to act as the debtor-in-possession, had negotiated a three-year
collective bargaining agreement with the union, which represented 40-45 percent of the firm's labor
force. Bildisco & Bildisco failed to meet its obligation under the agreement and subsequently re-
quested to reject the agreement under § 365(a). The bankruptcy court granted permission to reject
the agreement, noting that rejection of the agreement would save the company $100,000. 465 U.S.
at 518. The district court upheld the rejection. Id. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. In
re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982).
35 465 U.S. at 525. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the REA
Express standard. The Court in Bildisco indicated that the more stringent REA Express standard was
"fundamentally at odds with the policies of flexibility and equity built into Chapter 11;" that it would
subordinate the multiple, competing considerations of Chapter 11 reorganization to only one is-
sue-whether rejection is necessary to prevent the debtor's liquidation; and that the evidentiary bur-
den necessary to such standard would present difficulties which would interfere with the
reorganization process. Id.
36 Id. at 526. The Court also imposed on the employer a duty to make "reasonable efforts" to
renegotiate the collective bargaining agreement with the union, stating that before allowing an em-
ployer to reject the collective bargaining agreement, the bankruptcy court "should be persuaded
that reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification have been made and are not likely to
produce a prompt and satisfactory solution." Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 527. Justice Rehnquist's opinion also suggested that the bankruptcy court should make
a reasoned finding on the record which includes the likelihood and consequences of liquidation, the
reduced value of creditors' claims and subsequent hardships on them, and the impact of rejection on
the employees. Id.
39 Id. at 534. The Court noted, however, that the debtor-in-possession is not relieved of all
obligations under the NLRA simply by filing a petition for bankruptcy. For example, the Court
1988]
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was permitted to unilaterally reject labor contract terms prior to a court-
authorized rejection pursuant to section 365.40 Not surprisingly, the
Bildisco decision immediately received strong criticism for its purported
failure to fully consider national labor policies.41
C. The Enactment of Section 1113
The day after the Bildisco decision was announced, an amendment to
a then-pending bankruptcy reform bill was proposed that would overturn
Bildisco's rejection standard.42 Although Congress initially reached a
deadlock in its efforts to enact legislation that would better balance the
competing goals of labor and bankruptcy law,43 both houses ultimately
passed an emergency bankruptcy court restructuring bill that included a
stated that "[a] debtor-in-possession is an 'employer' within the terms of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 152(1) and (2), and is obligated to bargain collectively with the employees' certified representa-
tive over the terms of a new contract pending rejection of the existing contract or following formal
approval of rejection by the Bankruptcy Court." Id. See also N.L.R.B. v. Burns International Security
Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281 (1972).
40 The Court found that once a bankruptcy petition was filed, the collective bargaining agree-
ment was no longer an enforceable contract within the meaning of § 8(d) of the NLRA. 465 U.S. at
532.
41 See, e.g., Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 553 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also 130 CONG. REC. H1831
(daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984) (decision creates "a new and dangerous imbalance in the collective bargain-
ing process") (statement of Rep. Vento); id. at H1943 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1984) (arguing that the
Bildisco balancing test is "no test at all," since it only asks whether the contract's rejection would help
the debtor's reorganization, rather than whether rejection was necessary to the reorganization's suc-
cess) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
42 The amendment, proposed by Representative Rodino who was then Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, was drafted as an amendment to a bill that was pending to revise the bank-
ruptcy court system in light of the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the
bankruptcy court system had been given excessive powers (through the 1978 Reform Act) which
went beyond the scope of the Constitution. For a discussion of the broader bankruptcy system bill,
see Rosenberg, Bankruptcy and the Collective Bargaining Agreement-A Brief Lesson in the Use of The Constitu-
tional System of Checks and Balances, 58 AM. BANKR. LJ. 293, 315 (1984).
43 The Senate initially voted down all proposed alterations of the Bildisco standard. See Pulliam,
The Collision of Labor and Bankruptcy Law: Bildisco and the Legislative Response, 36 LAxi. L.J. 390, 396 &
396 n. 26 (1985); see also Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 308-321. The House, on the other hand,
passed legislation to restrict further the ability of debtors to reject a collective bargaining agreement.
The Rodino Bill, H.R. 5174, Title II(C), 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) emerged from the House as
part of the larger bankruptcy reform legislation. This provision would have disallowed rejection
unless a debtor could show that reorganization would fail without rejection of the contract. 130
CONG. REC. H1942 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984). The Rodino standard was similar to that adopted by
the Second Circuit in REA Express, supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
The Rodino Bill received intense criticism in the Senate, where Senator Strom Thurmond and
Senator Robert Packwood offered alternative amendments. Senator Thurmond, then Chairman of
the SenateJudiciary Committee, proposed an amendment that purported to preserve the Bildisco test
provided that "reasonable efforts" to negotiate changes in the contract had been made. 130 CONG.
REC. S6082 (daily ed. May 21, 1984). Senator Packwood developed an additional amendment for
the Senate's consideration with the cooperation of labor leaders. The Packwood amendment re-
quired a debtor to show that it had proposed "minimum [contract] modifications ... that would
permit the reorganization." 130 CONG. REC. S6181-82, 6192 (daily ed. May 22, 1984). Ultimately,
both the Thurmond and Packwood amendments were withdrawn out of fear that a filibuster on the
provisions might endanger a larger bill restructuring the bankruptcy court system which was pend-
ing in the Senate. See id. at 6186.
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response to Bildisco .44 The wording of the labor provision was left to a
conference committee, 45 and section 1113 resulted.46
Section 1113 requires a debtor-employer to obtain court approval
before unilaterally modifying a collective bargaining agreement. In addi-
tion, it establishes substantive and procedural requirements for rejection
which encourage the parties to renegotiate contracts voluntarily.47 To
satisfy section 1113, the debtor must propose modifications to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, give the union all financial information neces-
sary to evaluate them, and then bargain in good faith over the proposed
modifications. 48 If the debtor fails to reach an agreement with the union
after complying with these requirements, it can reject its labor contract
despite union objections provided that the bankruptcy court finds that
the debtor's modifications are "necessary" to permit reorganization. 49
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
which includes section 1113, was passed by a conference committee with-
out the customary committee report.50 Thus, the only record of the con-
gressional intent behind section 1113 consists of statements made on the
floor during general debate. Such statements generally do not constitute
authoritative legislative history;5 ' still, courts have turned to selective
legislative comments, as well as to national bankruptcy and labor poli-
44 Pressure was on Congress to pass a bill restructuring the federal bankruptcy court system in
the wake of the Marathon Pipeline case, supra note 42. Although Congress had enacted a series of
extensions of the bankruptcy system, the last of the extensions had expired on June 28, 1984, creat-
ing chaos as bankruptcy courts closed down, thereby engendering a backlog of cases. Thus, Senator
Robert Dole urged that the Senate pass the emergency restructuring bill without any "labor provi-
sion" and instead let the conference committee "hammer out" something that would be fair to both
business and labor. See 130 CONG. REC. S6186 (daily ed. May 21, 1984) (statements of Sen. Dole). A
comprehensive reform bill ultimately passed both houses.
45 See Overview: History of the Bankruptcy Code and Prior Bankruptcy Laws, 1 BANKRUPTCY, PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE 34 (Practicing Law Institute ed. 1984).
46 See supra note 3 for the text of 11 U.S.C. § 1113 as adopted by Congress.
47 Such requirements include providing the union with relevant information necessary to evalu-
ate the proposed modifications and conferring with the union in good faith to reach "mutually satis-
factory modifications" of the existing collective bargaining agreement. I1 U.S.C. § 1113(b). In
addition, authorization will be granted only where the union has refused to accept the proposed
modifications "without good cause" and where the balance of the equities favor rejection. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113(c).
48 Id. § 1113(b). See supra note 3 and infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
49 Id. § 11 13(b)(1)(A). The bankruptcy court also must find that the union refused to accept the
debtor's proposal without good cause and that the balance of the equities favor rejection of the
agreement, pursuant to § 1113(c)(2), (3).
50 See In re Carey Transportation Co., 50 Bankr. 203, 206 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Congress did
not agree on a Committee Report to accompany this section; there are only statements read into the
Congressional Record by various members of Congress on the date [§ 1113] was enacted.") and
1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 576. (For a discussion of Carcy at the appellate level, see infra
notes 78-102 and accompanying text.) See also Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelwork-
ers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1086 (3d Cir. 1986).
51 See, e.g., Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (stressing that the authoritative source
for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which represent "the
considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying
proposed legislation," id. (citing Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)), and that reliance should
not be placed on the passing comments of one member of Congress (citing Weinberger v. Rossi, 456
U.S. 25, 35 (1982)), nor on casual statements from the floor debates (citing United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968))).
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cies52 to determine the meaning of section 1113. Subsequent judicial
interpretation of the "necessary modifications" requirement of section
1113 has been varied, resulting in yet another split in the circuits regard-
ing the applicable standard for rejection. 53
II. Interpreting the "Necessary" Language in Section 1113: Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America
The Third Circuit's decision in Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United
Steelworkers of America 54 was the first appellate interpretation of section
1113's standard for rejecting collective bargaining agreements. In exam-
ining the "necessary modifications" language of section 1113, the court
divided its inquiry into two prongs: (1) the necessity of the proposed
modifications, and (2) the objective of the modifications. 55 The Third
Circuit dealt with the necessity prong by holding that a bankruptcy court
should permit only essential, minimum modifications to collective bar-
gaining agreements. 56 The court addressed the second prong by holding
that the objective of the modifications should be the short-term goal of
preventing the debtor's liquidation, as opposed to Chapter 1 l's overall
long-term goal of restoring the debtor to financial health. 57
A. The Facts of Wheeling
Wheeling-Pittsburgh is a large United States steel manufacturer.
The 1982 recession and increased foreign competition crippled the com-
pany, prompting it to seek concessions from its union, lenders, and
shareholders. 58 When negotiations failed, Wheeling-Pittsburgh filed a
Chapter 11 petition for bankruptcy. 59
52 The policy behind bankruptcy law is "to preserve the funds of the debtor for distribution to
creditors and to give the debtor a new start," while the basic policy of the labor law is "to encourage
creation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements." Comment, Collective Bargaining and
Banhruptcy, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 477 (1969). See also supra note 21 (discussing the balancing of the
labor law policies behind the NLRA with the bankruptcy policies behind the Bankruptcy Code).
53 See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation, Inc., 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that § 1113 allows modifications which are not absolutely minimal but rather which are merely
necessary for the long-term financial viability of the debtor); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v.
United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that only essential, minimum modifica-
tions to the collective bargaining agreement which prevent the debtor's actual liquidation should be
permitted under § 1113). See also infra notes 90-102 and accompanying text (discussion of Carey);
infra notes 64-77 and acccompanying text (discussion of Wheeling).
54 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986).
55 Id. at 1088. The Third Circuit referred to these two prongs as the "how necessary" and the
necessary to what" prongs. Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 1088-89. See supra note 2 for discussion of the goals of bankruptcy law.
58 Id. at 1076-77. The union workers, represented by United Steelworkers of America, had al-
ready agreed to concessions three times in the early 1980's. These concessions reduced the average
labor cost per employee from $25.00 per hour to a low of $18.60 per hour. After restorations had
increased the average labor cost back to $21.40, Wheeling-Pittsburgh requested a labor cost of ap-
proximately $19.00 for three years. Id.
59 Id. at 1077. After filing for bankruptcy, Wheeling-Pittsburgh proposed a five-year labor con-
tract with an average labor cost of $15.20 per hour. The company based its proposal on forecasts
which were far more pessimistic than earlier company forecasts. Id. at 1077-78. This proposal was
not accompanied by a snap-back clause which would have automatically increased wages if the com-
pany performed better than anticipated. Id. at 1089-90. Under its proposal, Wheeling-Pittsburgh
also wanted to reduce insurance benefits and eliminate supplemental unemployment guarantees, its
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After further negotiating problems,60 the company filed an applica-
tion with the bankruptcy court to reject its collective bargaining agree-
ment under section 1113;6 1 the petition was granted. 62 After the District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania affirmed the bankruptcy
court's decision,63 the matter came before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
B. The Wheeling Court's Adoption of an Essential, Short-Term Standard
In interpreting section 1113's "necessary modifications" language,
the Third Circuit in Wheeling placed major emphasis on the section's leg-
islative history, despite the absence of committee reports. The court rec-
ognized that comments made during floor debate lacked persuasive
authority but justified its reliance upon them on the ground that the stat-
ute itself did not define "necessary. ' 64 The court believed that the legis-
lative history shed light upon the necessity and object of the proposed
modifications. 65 The Third Circuit used these questions as a two-pron-
ged inquiry, stating that the questions of "how necessary" and "neces-
sary to what" illuminated the proper standard in section 1113 for
proposals to reject collective bargaining agreements.
1. The Degree or "How Necessary" Prong
The Wheeling court first discussed how necessary any proposed modi-
fications must be in order to comply with section 1113(b)(1)(A). 66 The
court indicated that a "necessary" modification should not be one which
was merely desirable for the debtor to impose; it believed Congress
wanted to afford a higher degree of protection to labor contracts than to
other executory contracts.6 7 Therefore, "necessary" modifications im-
pose a more stringent standard than one of mere desirability. The court
ruled that "necessary" as used in section 11 13 (b)(1)(A) means the same
as "essential" in section 1113(e),68 and rejected as too technical the ar-
profit-sharing plan, cash dividends on preferred stock, and its payments to the pension plan and
redemption fund. Id. at 1077-78.
60 The union had requested financial information from Wheeling-Pittsburgh; the company pro-
vided some, but not all of the requested information. After Wheeling-Pittsburgh announced that it
would not provide the union with any more information on the company's finances, the union re-
fused to respond to the restructuring proposal. Wheeling-Pittsburgh then filed its application to
reject the collective-bargaining agreement. Id. at 1078.
61 Id. Wheeling-Pittsburgh bypassed § 1113(e) which permits interim changes in a collective
bargaining agreement when essential to the continuation of the debtor's business during the time
the debtor is seeking rejection. See infra note 68. Instead, the company allowed the existing collec-
tive bargaining agreement to remain in force while it sought rejection of the agreement under
§ 1113(b)-(d).
62 In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 50 Bankr. 969, 972 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985).
63 In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 52 Bankr. 997, 1007 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
64 791 F.2d at 1086.
65 Id. at 1088.
66 See supra note 3 for the text of the statute.
67 791 F.2d at 1088. See also In re Mile Hi Metal Systems, Inc., 67 Bankr. 114, 118 (D. Colo.
1986) ("Congress did not intend, and the statute does not permit, the rejection of labor agreements
on a simplistic presentation of a need to reduce labor costs to become more competitive.")
68 791 F.2d at 1088. Section (e) permits interim changes in a collective bargaining agreement
before the bankruptcy court rules on rejection of the agreement. A bankruptcy court may permit
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gument that "essential" and "necessary" had different meanings because
they were in different subsections of section 1113.69
The court based this ruling on legislative history, stating that the
congressional consensus was that the "necessary" language was the
equivalent of the "minimum modification" standard expressed in an
amendment proposed by Senator Robert Packwood. The amendment,
although not adopted by the Senate, was considered by the conference
committee that drafted the final language of section 11 13. 70 Therefore,
the Wheeling court found that the "how necessary" prong should be "con-
strued strictly to signify only modifications that the [debtor] is con-
strained to accept" since this was the standard that the Packwood
amendment sought to establish. 7'
2. The Objective or "Necessary to What" Prong
Next, the Wheeling court turned to the question of what should be the
objective of the modifications. The court found that the plain language
of the statute alone did not sufficiently answer the question with its "nec-
essary to permit the reorganization of the debtor" language. 72 Thus, the
court looked to the congressional intent behind section 1113 and ruled
that the somewhat shorter-term goal of preventing the debtor's liquida-
tion was the objective behind those words. 73
interim changes when "essential" to the "continuation of the debtor's business" or "to avoid irrepa-
rable damage to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e) (Supp. III 1985).
69 791 F.2d at 1088.
70 Id. On the Senate floor, Senator Strom Thurmond stated that the "procedures and standard
[of the bill as it had come out of the conference committee] are essentially the same as those of the
Packwood amendment." 130 CONG. REc. 88888 (daily ed.June 29, 1984). But see id. at S8890 ("The
conference compromise evenly splits the difference between Bildisco and Packwood") (remarks of
Sen. Dole); id. at S8892 ("The conference's compromise adheres to the spirit of this unanimous
Supreme Court decision [Bildisco].") (remarks of Sen. Hatch).
The relevant portion of the Packwood proposal read as follows:
(b)(1) Subsequent to filing a petition and prior to filing an application seeking rejec-
tion of a collective bargaining agreement, the trustee shall-
(A) make a proposal, based on the most complete and reliable information available,
to the authorized representative of the employees covered by such agreement, providing
for the minimum modifications in such employees benefits and protections that would per-
mit the reorganization, taking into account the best estimate of the sacrifices expected to be
made by all classes of creditors and other affected parties to the reorganization;...
(C) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement only if the court finds that-
(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the requirements
of subsection (b)(1);
(2) the authorized representative has refused to accept such proposal and under the
circumstances such refusal was unjustified; and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement....
(e) No provision of this title shall be construed to permit a debtor in possession or a
trustee to unilaterally terminate or alter any provision of a collective bargaining agreement
before approval or rejection of such contract under this section.
130 CONG. REC. S6181-82 (daily ed. May 22, 1984).
71 791 F.2d at 1088. The court overruled the district court, since the district court had stated
that "necessary" does not mean "absolutely essential." In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 52
Bankr. 997, 1003 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
72 791 F.2d at 1088.
73 Id. at 1089. See also In re William Brogna, Inc., 64 Bankr. 390, 392 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986)
(following the Wheeling decision that modifications must be limited to those necessary to prevent
liquidation).
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The court argued that its interpretation was also supported by the
statutory language that limits modifications to those necessary to permit
the reorganization of the debtor.74 The Wheeling court asserted that the
word "permit" was more in harmony with the short-term goal of avoid-
ing liquidation than with the longer-term goal of promoting financial
health. 75
After its two-pronged inquiry, the court held that section 1113 lim-
ited modifications to a collective bargaining agreement to those essential
to prevent the debtor's immediate liquidation. 76 The court ruled that
bankruptcy courts should not interpret section 1113 to permit modifica-
tions which are necessary merely to achieve the Chapter 11 goal of re-
turning the debtor to financial health. The Third Circuit's standard
remained the only interpretation of the "necessary" language of section
1113 among the circuits for nearly a year, until the Second Circuit de-
cided Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transportation, Inc. 77
III. The Carey Response to Wheeling: Splitting the Circuits as to the
Definition of "Necessary"
In contrast to the Wheeling court, the Second Circuit in Truck Drivers
Local 807 v. Carey Transportation, Inc. interpreted section 1113 to give
management greater latitude in proposing labor contract modifica-
tions.78 The Carey court held that modifications need not be restricted to
those which are absolutely minimal, and that "reorganization" refers to
the long-term financial viability of the debtor rather than to short-term
economic health.79
74 791 F.2d at 1089.
75 Id. Apparently, had Congress chosen a word such as "encourage" or "promote" so that the
statute would allow modifications which "encouraged" or "promoted" the reorganization of the
debtor, the language would then be more in harmony with the long-term Chapter 11 goal of restor-
ing the debtor to financial health. The stronger language would be more liberal in allowing modifi-
cations than the word "permit." The Third Circuit remanded the Wheeling case for further
proceedings, finding that the lower courts had applied the wrong standard of "necessity" to the case.
76 Id. at 1088-1089. The court's decision on whether the "necessary modification" standard
should take into consideration the extra cash made available to the debtor by the automatic stay
provision of Chapter I 1 of the Bankruptcy Code is also noteworthy. The union had argued that
because Wheeling-Pittsburgh could abide by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement for
the remaining thirteen months and still emerge with enough cash on hand to meet its current operat-
ing expenses, rejection was not necessary to avoid liquidation. Id. at 1089. The bankruptcy court
had noted that the only reason Wheeling-Pittsburgh would have this cash available was because
bankruptcy proceedings had frozen the status of creditors who would otherwise have required pay-
ment. In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 50 Bankr. 969, 977 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985). See 11
U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. III 1985) (automatic stay provision that freezes the status of creditors). The
Third Circuit agreed that determining the necessity of modifications in light of the additional cash
created by the reorganization proceeding would be inequitable. 791 F.2d at 1089. One commenta-
tor has suggested that the Wheeling court failed to apply its own short-term liquidation standard to
this case because that standard would have required the court to accept the union's argument that no
modifications were essential to avoid liquidation. Note, Statutory Protection for Union Contracts in Chap-
ter 11 Reorganization Proceedings, 19 CONN. L. REv. 401, 430-31 (1987). But this is inaccurate since the
Third Circuit remanded this case partially because the bankruptcy court failed to apply a short-term
standard. See 791 F.2d at 1090-91. The Wheeling court did apply its short-term standard, but held
that in the examination of whether modifications were necessary to avoid liquidation the cash made
available by the automatic stay provision of Chapter 11 should be disregarded. Id. at 1089.
77 816 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1987).
78 Id. at 90.
79 Id.
1988]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
A. The Facts of Carey
Carey Transportation Inc., a bus company providing shuttle service
from New York airports, reported large annual losses from 1982 to
1985.80 Attempting to remedy its situation, Carey negotiated for wage
cuts with its union, Truck Drivers Local 807.81 Nevertheless, Carey pro-
jected losses for the 1986 fiscal year of up to $950,000.82
After the collapse of further negotiations concerning pay and benefit
reductions,8 3 Carey filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 and sub-
mitted proposals to the union for modification of its collective bargaining
agreement.8 4 Carey justified the cutbacks as necessary in order to
counteract projected losses, ameliorate its debt-ridden condition, and
generate capital to repair and modernize its buses. The union immedi-
ately rejected the modification proposals,8 5 and Carey filed for formal
rejection of the union contract under section 1113. The bankruptcy
court held that Carey had complied with section 1113 and granted its
petition for rejection of the collective bargaining agreement;8 6 on appeal,
the Southern District of New York affirmed without opinion the bank-
ruptcy court's holding.8 7
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also upheld the bankruptcy
court's analysis and thereby departed from the Third Circuit's holding in
Wheeling.88 While the Second Circuit accepted the two-prong method of
inquiry set forth in Wheeling, it rejected the Wheeling court's answers to the
questions of "how necessary" and "necessary to what." The court sum-
marized its holding: "[T]he necessary requirement [of section 1113]
places on the debtor the burden of proving that its proposal.., contains
necessary, but not absolutely minimal, changes that will enable the
debtor to complete the reorganization process successfully."8 9
80 Id. at 85. Carey lost $750,000 in fiscal 1983, $1,500,000 in 1984, and $2,500,000 in 1985.
81 Id. The negotiations resulted in an agreement which cut Carey's operating costs by paying
newly-hired drivers reduced wages and benefits. Carey also cut expenses in 1984 and 1985 by
streamlining management, permanently laying off forty drivers and obtaining a deferral of interest
payments on loans from a major creditor. Id. at 85, 91.
82 Id. at 85.
83 Id. Negotiations in January 1985 concerned "lunch periods, booking and checkout time,
driver rotation rules, holidays, vacation days, sick days, fringe benefits contributions, supplemental
unemployment compensation, and supplemental disability insurance .... Id. Carey'sJanuary pro-
posals, if implemented, would have saved the company $750,000 a year. In March, however, Carey
further requested that the collective bargaining agreement be extended for two years, during which
wages and fringe benefits would remain the same. Id.
84 Id. at 86. The formal proposals included:
(I) freezing all wages for second-tier drivers and reducing wages for first-tier drivers (those
on the payroll prior to July 1, 1984) by $1.00 per hour; (2) reducing health and pension
benefit contributions by approximately $1.50 per hour; (3) replacing daily overtime with
weekly overtime; (4) eliminating all sick days and reducing the number of paid holidays;
(5) eliminating supplemental workers' compensation and supplemental disability payments;
(6) eliminating premium payments and reducing commissions paid to charter drivers; and
(7) changing numerous scheduling and assignment rules. All terms were to be frozen for
three years under this post-petition proposal.
Id.
85 Id.
86 In re Carey Transportation, Inc., 50 Bankr. 203, 209 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
87 816 F.2d at 87 (referring to unreported order of district court).
88 Id. at 90.
89 Id.
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B. Carey's Emphasis on Non-Essential Long-Term Reorganization
1. The Degree or "How Necessary" Prong
The legislative history and the statutory requirement that the debtor
negotiate in good faith constituted two bases for the Carey court's answer
to the first inquiry: how "necessary" must the modifications be?90 First,
the court looked to the legislative history of section 1113. The court
recognized the similarity between the "necessary" language *of section
1113 and the "minimum modifications" language proposed by Senator
Packwood, but noted that Congress had chosen not to adopt the
Packwood amendment. 91 The Second Circuit reasoned that had the
committee meant to accept Senator Packwood's bare-minimum level of
modifications, they would not have substituted the alternative language
of "necessary" modifications.92
The court further analyzed the meaning of "necessary" in relation to
the debtor's concurrent obligation to bargain in good faith after submit-
ting the proposed modifications to the collective bargaining agree-
ment.93 The court argued that the bare-minimum standard of Wheeling
would put the debtor in a "catch-22" situation. If the debtor submitted
only minimum changes, it would have no room to make concessions
when bargaining with the union, as required by statute.94 The court also
observed that if the debtor provided room in its proposed changes to
dicker, any concession would show that the original proposal had vio-
lated the bare-minimum standard.95 Therefore, the court concluded that
Congress intended "necessary" to allow a greater degree of changes
than minimal modifications, but only those modifications that the debtor
could propose in good faith.96
2. The Objective or "Necessary to What" Prong
The Carey court continued its analysis of "necessary" through the
second aspect of inquiry, "necessary to what." Based upon the require-
ments of section 1113(e)97 and section 1129(a)(11) 98 of the Bankruptcy
90 Id. at 89.
91 Id. at 89. See also supra note 70 for language of the Packwood amendment.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 90. The Carey court seemed to base this requirement to bargain in good faith upon the
language of § 11 13(b)(2). See supra note 3 for statutory language.
95 The Carey court borrowed this argument from In re Allied Delivery Co., 49 Bankr. 700, 702
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) stating that, "[t]his court finds that in the context of this statute 'necessary'
must be read as a term of lesser degree than 'essential.' To find otherwise would be to render the
subsequent requirement of good faith negotiation .... meaningless ......
96 816 F.2d at 89.
97 See supra note 95.
98 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (Supp. III 1985) provides in relevant part:
The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following conditions are met:
(11) Confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation, or the need for
further financial reorganization by the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan,
unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan.
Id.
The plan referred to in § 1129 is the vehicle for rehabilitation of the debtor under Chapter 11.
In general, the plan is a deal struck between the parties in interest and the proponent (debtor or
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Code, the court rejected the Wheeling court's contention that section
11 13(b)(1)(A) applied to short-term reorganization of the debtor and
concluded that the object of the proposed changes was the long-term
financial health of the debtor.99
In essence, the Carey court approached its task of defining "neces-
sary modifications" from a practical as well as an academic standpoint.100
It explained that the "minimum modifications" standard of Wheeling was
inconsistent with the debtor's obligations to bargain in good faith with
the union,' 0 and that if the debtor needs only short-term, interim relief
to prevent its liquidation, section 1113(e) was the applicable provision of
the Bankruptcy Code.' 0 2
IV. Assessing Wheeling and Carey in Terms of
Legal Substance and Precision
To evaluate the courts' decisions, it is essential to assess both the
quality of the authorities upon which the decisions were based, and the
trustee). COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 20.17 at 297 (1986 ed.). Since the plan impairs
some obligations of creditors, they must agree to it (except where the cram-down provision of
§ 1129(b) applies). Chapter I 1 envisions that they will do so in exchange for a greater return on
their investments in the form of either ownership rights in the reorganized company or fuller repay-
ment over an extended period of time. But, under the § I 129(a)(11) requirement, a court will not,
despite the intention of creditors, approve a reorganization likely to end in liquidation except where
orderly liquidation is the explicit purpose of the plan. Id. § 20.25 at 333-34. See also infra note 99.
99 For the Wheeling standard, see 791 F.2d at 1088-89. See also supra notes 72-77 and accompany-
ing text. For the Carey standard, see supra notes 79 and 89 and accompanying text.
The court pointed to § 1113(e) as the appropriate provision for short-term relief designed to
allow the continuation of the debtor's business or prevent irreparable damage to the estate. 816
F.2d at 89. Only in this interim relief context, the court explained, are a debtor's proposed changes
restricted to the bare-minimum modifications required for short-term survival. Id. Thereby, the
court implied that it was incorrect for the Wheeling court to interpret the language of § 11 13(b)(1) as
providing short-term relief.
The court further relied on § 1 129(a) (1 1) to substantiate its conclusion that the "necessary to
what" prong concerned the successful reorganization of the debtor, rather than merely preventing
the debtor's liquidation. Id. at 89. Section 1129 requires a court to confirm a reorganization plan
only if it is not likely to be followed by liquidation or further financial reorganization. The court
then argued that inherent in the concept of reorganization is the long-term economic health of the
debtor. This argument has particular weight in light of cases interpreting the § I 129(a) (1 1) require-
ment: In re Belco Vending, Inc., 67 Bankr. 234, 237 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (holding that a court will
oppose a plan for reorganization approved by the debtor's creditors where the debtor's capital struc-
ture, earning powers, the economic conditions and the abilities of management make likely future
liquidation or need for further reorganization); In re Pizza of Hawaii, Inc., 761 F.2d 1374, 1382 (9th
Cir. 1985) (holding that the "bankruptcy court's finding of feasibility [under § 1129(a)(1 1)] was
clearly erroneous because the plan failed to provide for the possibility that Shakey's would recover a
large judgment [against the debtor] in the civil case"); In re Great Northern Protective Services, Inc.,
19 Bankr. 802, 803 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982) (" '[n]either the Code nor its predecessor statutes
were intended to prolong a hopeless situation and to postpone inevitable liquidation. If the facts
indicate that the plan cannot be performed, it is not feasible and cannot be confirmed ....... "(quot-
ing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1129.02(11) at 1129-35 (15th ed. 1981))). Hence, such long-term
financial health was the appropriate object of the debtor's proposed changes.
100 816 F.2d at 89-90. For instance, the Carey court writes:
[t]hus, in virtually every case, it becomes impossible to weigh necessity as to reorganization
without looking into the debtor's ultimate future and estimate what the debtor needs to
obtain financial health. As the Royal Composing Room court phrased it, '[a] debtor can live on
water alone for a short time but over the long haul it needs food to sustain itself and retain
its vigor .....
Id. (quoting In re Royal Composing Room, Inc., 62 Bankr. 403, 418 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
101 816 F.2d at 89.
102 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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clarity of the holdings in terms of resolving the issues and preventing
future litigation. Regarding the strength of authority that formed the
foundation of each decision, the Carey analysis appears to be generally
superior to the Wheeling analysis. However, in terms of utility, the Wheel-
ing decision dictates a definite standard while the Carey decision does not.
A. Nature of the Supporting Authorities
The Carey court based its analysis of "necessary" on the legislative
history of section 1113, which included the Packwood proposal, the con-
current obligation of good faith imposed by section 11 13(b)(1)(A), the
available short-term relief of section 1113(e), and the section 1129 re-
strictions governing judicial approval of a reorganization plan. The
Wheeling court, however, based its decision primarily upon section 1113's
legislative history, which in itself is inconsistent. The weakness of the
legislative history as a basis for the Wheeling decision is apparent upon
careful scrutiny of its content. 0 3
The Wheeling decision is also weak because the court did not fully
discuss whether a short-term liquidation standard could be harmonized
with the statute's conjunctive requirement that all affected parties be
treated fairly and equitably. The court noted that the "fair and equita-
ble" requirement prevents a court from rejecting a labor contract solely
because it is equitable to the creditors. But it did not explain how other
parties could be considered to have been treated fairly and equitably if
those parties had to make deeper sacrifices to meet the long-term Chap-
ter 11 goal of restoring the debtor to financial health while the union had
to make only bare minimum cutbacks necessary to avoid liquidation.
Nonunion workers and creditors faced with such sacrifices would not
likely consider such a situation fair and equitable. 104 Had the court con-
103 The legislative history of § 1113 does not clearly show that Congress intended a short-term
goal of preventing liquidation as the Wheeling court maintained. The statements of the Congressmen
quoted in Wheeling consistently cite the objective of proposed modifications to collective bargaining
agreements in terms of "reorganization of the debtor" or "successful reorganization." 791 F.2d at
1087-88. Among those statements which the Third Circuit relied upon in arguing for a short-term
standard were Congressman Morrison's remark that "the trustee must limit his proposal.., to only
those modifications that must be accomplished if the reorganization is the succeed," Id. at 1087 (quoting
130 CONG. REC. H7496 (daily ed.June 29, 1984)) (emphasis added), and Senator Packwood's remark
that "only modifications which are necessary to a successful reorganization may be proposed." Id. at
1088 (quoting 130 CONG. REC. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984)) (emphasis added).
However, the words "successful reorganization" do not clearly establish a short-term goal since
those words could just as easily refer to the long-term goal of restoring the debtor to financial
health. The Third Circuit recognized that the words "successful reorganization" could refer to
either a short-term or a long-term goal. First, the court noted that Senator Orrin Hatch viewed the
statutory language as a codification of the Bildisco decision which had permitted rejection based on
"the likelihood of successful reorganization," which in Bildisco had referred to the long-term goal of
returning the debtor to financial health. Id. (quoting 130 CONG. REC. S8892 (daily ed. June 29,
1984)) (emphasis added). Second, the Third Circuit chastened the bankruptcy court for interpreting
the § 1113 standard in terms of "successful reorganization," an interpretation the Third Circuit
recognized as referring to the long-term health of the debtor. Id. at 1090 (citing In re Wheeling-
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 50 Bankr. 969, 978 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1985)). The court's subtle divination of
when "successful reorganization" points to a short-term goal and when it points to a long-term goal
weakens its decision.
104 791 F.2d at 1089. The statute states that modifications must assure that "all creditors, the
debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably." 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(b)(1)(A)
(Supp. III 1985). Both of the federal circuits which have interpreted § 1113's language have recog-
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sidered the additional authorities analyzed in Carey, its interpretation of
section 1113 might have been more compatible with the intent and pur-
pose of the Bankruptcy Code.
B. The Effectiveness of the Courts' Standards
While the Wheeling court's analysis of the relevant sources may have
been less than thorough, its holding was clear: a court can permit only
those modifications that are essential to the short-term goal of prevent-
ing the debtor's liquidation. The Carey court's holding was weaker in
that it did not state exactly how necessary the "more than bare-mini-
mum" proposed changes to a collective bargaining agreement must
be. 10 5 By failing to establish a definite standard, the Carey test hampers
the purpose of section 1113: that is, to create a means of modifying col-
lective bargaining agreements rather than completely rejecting them or
forcing the debtor into liquidation. Since Carey failed to provide debtors
and creditors with precise judicial standards, such parties will be unsure
about what they must concede in section 1113 bargaining and therefore
cannot effectively negotiate.'0 6 A more precise definition of the degree
nized that non-union workers fall within the "affected parties" class. Wheeling, 791 F.2d at 1092
(noting that all parties who might be asked to make concessions are affected parties); Truck Drivers
Local 807 v. Carey Transportation, Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 90-91 (2d Cir. 1987) (indicating that manage-
ment and non-union employees are affected parties). The legislative history also sheds light on the
"affected parties" classification. Senator Strom Thurmond, in referring to the compromise lan-
guage, stated, "The phrase 'all of the affected parties' is obviously not meant to include any party
which might conceivably be affected in any minor way, but is intended to encompass those parties
directly affected. This phrase clearly includes, however, all nonunion employees of the debtor, whose
interests should be as carefuly considered by the court as those of any union employees." 130 CONG.
REC. S8888 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (emphasis added). Therefore, Senator Thurmond concluded
the union workers, the nonunion workers, and the creditors must all be treated fairly and equitably.
Even though § 1113 does create a preference for labor contracts, a court should recognize that
the "fair and equitable" requirement places a boundary on how great that preference is. If a court
grants such a high degree of preference to a labor contract that nonunion workers and creditors are
forced to make much greater concessions than union workers, the court has gone beyond that
boundary to the point that all of the affected parties are no longer treated fairly and equitably. A
court should weigh the "fair and equitable" requirement when it interprets the "necessary" lan-
guage of § 1113. When that language is interpreted in such a way that nonunion workers and credi-
tors bear the burden of making the concessions necessary for Chapter 1l's long-term goal of
restoring the debtor to financial health while union workers only have to make bare minimum con-
cessions necessary to avoid liquidation, the court has interpreted "necessary" in such a way that is
not in harmony with the rest of the statute. See Gibson, The New Law on Rqection of Collective Bargain-
ingAgreements in Chapter 11: An Analysis of ll U.S.C § 1113, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 340 (1984) ("[A]
proposal is not 'fair and equitable' unless it requires all affected parties, management and nonunion
employees as well as the unionized workers, to sacrifice to a similar degree"). But see Note, supra
note 12, at 1052 ("The general bankruptcy principle of assigning unequal priority to different classes
of creditors instead requires that the magnitude of the creditors' sacrifices in bankruptcy be gauged
by the strength of their preexisting rights.... The debtor's nonunion employees are not protected
by the NLRA in the pre-bankruptcy world; therefore, they do not deserve the same protection in
bankruptcy as union employees receive.").
105 See supra text accompanying notes 79, 89.
106 See, e.g., In re Carey Transportation, Inc., 50 Bankr. 203, 209 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[T]he
§ 1113 process is designed to encourage selective, necessary contract modifications rather than a
total elimination of all provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. Complete de novo negotia-
tion would be wasteful and counterproductive.").
[Vol. 63:79
CASE COMMENTS
of necessity would better inform potential litigants and facilitate section
1113 negotiations.10 7
Other federal bankruptcy courts have provided some guidance to-
ward such a standard. In In re Cook United, Inc. ,10 the court held that
modifications were necessary for reorganization if "[t]he adoption of the
modifications would result in a significantly greater probability of the
debtor successfully reorganizing than would result if the debtor were re-
quired to continue the collective bargaining agreement sought to be re-
jected."' 09  Similarly, the court in In re Walway Co., 10  held that
"necessary modifications" concern "giving the debtor a better opportu-
nity to reorganize and become profitable again.... The evidence is per-
suasive that if the contract is modified that [the company's] chances of
reorganization and return to profitability are far greater.""'
Such holdings give substance to the "necessary modifications" anal-
ysis by focusing on the extent to which a reduction in operating costs
resulting from modifications will make a Chapter 11 reorganization more
likely. At the same time an interpretation of section 1113 that is true to
the primary policy underlying labor law, the maintenance of stable con-
tractual relations through group bargaining, must adopt the converse of
the Cook and Walway standards. Under such a standard, when the final
dollar savings resulting from all cost cutting measures does not signifi-
cantly increase the likelihood of reorganization, the proposed modifica-
tions are not "necessary." ' " 2 Incorporating this observation into a
section 1113 standard, a court should find that proposed modifications
are "necessary" only if the modifications significantly increase the likeli-
hood of reorganization and do so despite the effect of other cost cutting
measures." 3 This standard would exclude de minimus proposals, since
taken together they would not significantly increase the chance of reor-
ganization." 4 In addition, it would exclude superfluous proposals be-
cause when cost savings from other measures are high, modifications to
107 See 130 CONG. REC. S8888 (daily ed. June 19, 1984) (statement of Sen. Thurmond)
("[L]egitimate concerns have been raised regarding the broadness and vagueness of [the § 1113]
language. I would hope that courts will interpret both provisions in the most practical, workable
manner possible."). See also, HAGGARD & PULLIAM, supra note 2, at 81-82 (1987).
108 50 Bankr. 561 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
109 Id. at 563 (quoting In re Wright Airlines, Inc., No. 84-02493 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985)).
110 69 Bankr. 967 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987).
111 Id. at 973 (citations omitted).
112 The ratio of management cost reductions to labor cost reductions is governed by the
§ 11 13(b)(l)(A) "fair and equitable" requirement. See supra note 3.
113 For example, Corporation A files a petition to reject its collective bargaining agreement with
Union B. A's overall plans to reduce overhead costs include: (1) reduction in management salaries;
(2) reductions in health and dental insurance benefits for B workers; and (3) reductions in the aver-
age hourly wage paid to B workers by $1.00 per hour. Expert testimony shows that the measures will
make successful reorganization over a three year period 90 percent likely, but that any additional
cuts will only increase that percentage to 93 percent. The expert testifies that without item (2), the
chances of successful reorganization are only 50 percent, and that without item (3), the chances are
only 25 percent. On these facts, proposed modifications (2) and (3) are necessary, but the court
should allow no further modifications.
114 See, e.g., In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907, 910-11 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984), in which
the court would not allow rejection of a collective bargaining agreement because the proposed mod-
ifications would result in an only two percent reduction of labor costs. The court concluded that the
debtor was using the petition for rejection primarily to force early renegotiation.
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the labor contract would not significantly increase the likelihood of reor-
ganization. 115 In so doing, the proposed standard fulfills the dual intent
of section 1113-to facilitate reorganization of the debtor, while accord-
ing a special status to union contracts." 16
V. An Alternative Reading of Section 1113(b)(1)(A)
Section 1113(b) (1) (A) requires the debtor to make a proposal that
"provides for those necessary modifications in the employees benefits and
protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor," 117 before the debtor can reject a collective bargaining agree-
ment. Clearly, the drafting committee was not seeking to be redundant
in its repeated use of the word "necessary." ' 1 8 Therefore, as recognized
by the Wheeling and Carey courts, "necessary" must be interpreted as de-
fining different aspects of the allowable changes. 119
The Wheeling and Carey courts concluded that both of the two aspects
of inquiry are concerned with defining only the degree of modifications
permitted. The first inquiry of necessity, "how necessary," corresponds
with section 1113's requirement that the proposal include "those neces-
sary modifications in the employee's benefits and protections."' 120 The
two courts considered different degrees of necessity, ranging from mini-
mal to desirable. 12 1 The courts further defined the amount of permissi-
ble changes through the second inquiry: "necessary to what." This
aspect of necessity corresponds to the language of the statute requiring
modifications to be "necessary to permit the reorganization of the
debtor."' 122 The courts correctly concluded that the purpose of the mod-
ifications can determine the degree of modifications allowable. However,
both courts missed a crucial aspect of "necessity" as used in section
1113.
While it is likely that Congress included "necessary" in the first part
of section 1113 (b) (1) (A) ("necessary modifications in the employees ben-
efits and protections") to define the degree of modifications allowable,
the committee probably did not repeat the word to further define the
permissible degree in the second part of the provision. A more plausible
explanation for the committee's inclusion of "necessary" a second time
in section 11 13(b)(1)(A) ("necessary to permit reorganization of the
debtor") is that Congress sought to define the types of benefits and pro-
115 Seesupra note 112.
116 See supra note 2.
117 11 U.S.C. § 11 13(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985) (emphasis added).
118 Each word of a statute must be construed to have a particular meaning. See, e.g., Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985) (recognizing the elementary
canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part inoperative).
119 Carey, 816 F.2d at 88 (recognizing that the provision raises questions of "how necessary" and
"necessary to what"); Wheeling, 791 F.2d at 1088 (arguing that legislative history illuminates two
aspects of the court's inquiry into necessity).
120 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
121 The court in Wheeling stated that the degree of necessity required by the statute was more than
mere desirability. Wheeling, 791 F.2d at 1088. The Carey court concluded that the required degree
was more than minimum modifications. Carey, 816 F.2d at 89.
122 11 U.S.C. § l1l3(b)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1985).
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tections which may be changed.1 23 However, neither Wheeling nor Carey
explicitly recognized this alternative.
The Wheeling and Carey courts turned to the legislative history and
the language of the proposed amendments for guidance to define "nec-
essary" as it is used in section 1113.124 The Wheeling court noted Senator
Packwood's statement that:
[O]nly modifications which are necessary to a successful reorganiza-
tion may be proposed. Therefore, the debtor will not be able to ex-
ploit the bankruptcy procedure to rid itself of unwanted features of the
labor agreement that have no relation to its financial condition and its
reorganization and which earlier were agreed to by the debtor. The
word "necessary" inserted twice into this provision clearly emphasizes
this required aspect of the proposal which the debtor must offer and
guarantees the sincerity of the debtor's good faith in seeking contract
changes. 125
Further, the Wheeling court stated that necessity must be "construed
strictly to signify only modifications that the trustee is constrained to ac-
cept because they are directly related to the company's financial condi-
tion and its reorganization." 126 However, while it noted Senator
Packwood's comment that "necessary" was included to limit the type of
contract changes to those with a financial impact, the court nevertheless
interpreted "necessary" in terms of the degree of allowable changes.
The Carey court did not criticize this conclusion, but only disagreed with
Wheeling's definition of the permissible degree.
Senator Packwood's comments illustrate the motivating force behind
organized labor's move to persuade Congress to statutorily overrule
Bildisco: namely, the fear that companies were using Chapter 11 to cir-
cumvent labor statutes and rid themselves of unwanted collective bar-
gaining agreements. 127 This fear was not unfounded in light of the
bankruptcy filings by several major corporations. 128 Furthermore, Con-
gress expressly recognized this concern. 129 While both the Wheeling and
Carey courts noted this, °30 neither considered the types of modifications
fundamental to the definition of "necessary." However, subsequent
courts seized upon Wheeling and Carey's tangential recognition of these
types of concerns as authority to consider the type of change as a deter-
123 See infra note 131.
124 Carey, 816 F.2d at 89 and supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text; Wheeling, 791 F.2d at
1088 and supra notes 64-65, 70 and accompanying text.
125 Wheeling, 791 F.2d at 1088 (citing 130 CONG. REc. S8898 (daily ed. June 29, 1984)).
126 Wheeling, 791 F.2d at 1088.
127 See Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 312 (citing DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 152 at A-6 (October 5,
1983)).
128 For example, union representatives have charged that Johns Manville Corporation, which
filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1982, was using bankruptcy to reduce its financial responsibilities to
its employees. See Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 304 (citing R. Belous, Cotporate Bankruptcy and Labor
Contracts in Light of the Supreme Court Decision (N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH ISSUE
BRIEF lB 84072. 69 at 2-3 (March 2, 1984). Also, after Continental Airlines filed for bankruptcy and
rejected its collective bargaining agreement, the unions moved to dismiss the proceeding on the
ground that Continental had filed in bad faith. In re Continental Airlines, 38 Bankr. 67, 69 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1984).
129 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 194 at A-6 (October 5, 1983).
130 Carey, 816 F.2d at 87; Wheeling, 791 F.2d at 1082.
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mining factor in analyzing the propriety of a debtor's proposed modifica-
tions to the collective bargaining agreement.' 3 '
VI. Conclusion
Congress enacted section 1113 in response to the fears of organized
labor that if rejection of collective bargaining agreements was permitted
under the "fair and equitable" standard of Bildisco, management would
eviscerate such agreements through the use of Chapter 11 proceedings.
Section 1113 provides a negotiation mechanism for modifying labor con-
tracts by specifying that only "necessary modifications" may be proposed
during section 1113 negotiations if the union's failure to accept the pro-
posals is to serve as the basis for a judicial order for rejection.
With the Carey decision, the circuits are now split as to the sort of
modifications a debtor must first propose in order to be justified in peti-
tioning for rejection. While the Carey court did well to reject the Wheeling
court's selective reading of legislative history, the Carey decision itself im-
perils litigants by leaving them without judicially manageable standards
for assessing "necessary modifications" under section 1113(b)(1)(A). A
more effective analysis of section 1113 defines "necessary modifications"
as those modifications which significantly increase the likelihood of reor-
ganization, and which do so despite the cumulative effects of other cost-
saving measures. The text of section 1113 supports this analysis since its
repetition of the word "necessary" confines section 1113 proposals to
those types of modification which result in direct savings to the debtor.
Courts should apply this more manageable standard in future instances
where a debtor seeks to set aside a collective bargaining agreement inci-
dent to bankruptcy proceedings. Such an application will better balance
the interests of labor and management, while remaining consistent with
131 For instance, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in
In re Brogna, 64 Bankr. 390 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986), while purporting to be bound to apply § 1113 in
the "precise manner enunciated in the Wheeling decision," id. at 392, implicitly expanded Wheeling's
two aspects of inquiry through its analysis of the types of modifications allowed. The Brogna court
found that many of the debtor's proposed modifications had no financial impact and thus no direct
bearing on preventing a debtor's liquidation. The court pointed to changes in the grievance proce-
dure, union security, and apprentice ratios as illustrative of inappropriate proposals. Id. It con-
cluded that the debtor had failed to satisfy the necessity requirement of § 1113 and therefore
refused to allow rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio, in In re Valley Kitchens,
52 Bankr. 493 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985), similarly refused to authorize a debtor's proposed modifica-
tions which included changes that would have resulted in no savings to the debtor. Subjects dealt
with in the proposal to which no saving was assigned included overtime, shut downs, job classifica-
tion, promotion and transfer, and absenteeism and tardiness. Id. at 495. The court explained that
the thrust of organized labor's lobbying effort was to overturn Bildisco through a statute that would
limit a bankruptcy court's discretion to permit a debtor's rejection of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, and instead would emphasize negotiation between the parties. Id. at 496. Therefore, the
court held that a proposal must deal only with changes which would result in direct savings for the
debtor. Id. at 495.
This position finds further support in In re K & B Mounting, Inc., 50 Bankr. 460 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1985), in which the court explained that § 1113 "created an expedited form of collective bar-
gaining with a number of safeguards designed to insure that the employers cannot use Chapter 11
solely to rid themselves of their union, but only [may propose] modifications that are truly necessary
for the firm's survival." Id. at 462-63 n.3 (citing Gibson, The New Law on Rejection of Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements in Chapter 11: An Analysis of 11 U.S.C. § 1113, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 327 (1984)).
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the purposes underlying the Bankruptcy Code and the National Labor
Relations Act.
Brian J. Beck
Marlene B. Hanson
B. Douglas Hayes
Kevin M. Judiscak
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BRITTON V. SOUTH BEND COMMUNITY SCHOOL
CORPORATION: Do AFFIRMATIVE ACTION LAYOFF PLANS THAT CREATE AN
ABSOLUTE RACIAL PREFERENCE VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION PER SE?
The development of affirmative action plans appears to contradict
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment' by promoting
government sanctioned favoritism on the basis of race. On a literal read-
ing of the equal protection clause, it would appear that such favoritism
would be unconstitutional in any circumstance. However, because of the
deep-seated discrimination prevalent in many areas of American society,
the Supreme Court in numerous cases has upheld the preferential em-
ployment treatment of minorities. 2
In December, 1978, the South Bend, Indiana, School Board, in an-
ticipation of possible layoffs and in fear of losing the possible gains made
through recent minority hirings, adopted a contractual provision to pre-
vent the layoff of minorities. 3 A number of nonminority teachers who
were subsequently laid off challenged this "no minority layoff provision"
as denying them equal protection under the law. 4
In Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp. ,5 the Seventh Circuit
held, en banc, 6 that the "no minority layoff" clause was a per se violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and also
held that an absolute preference in any affirmative action plan would be
unconstitutional. 7 This comment will analyze this decision and its impli-
cations for the future of equal protection law and affirmative action pro-
grams. Part I discusses the facts of Britton, and surveys the opinions it
produced. Part II examines the judicial treatment of affirmative action
plans before Britton with emphasis on the different tests used by the
courts when analyzing affirmative action plans. Part III analyzes the
opinions in Britton and discusses an alternative avenue for courts to take
when deciding the future of affirmative action programs. Part IV con-
cludes that the Britton court's broad per se rule as to absolute preferences
added little clarity to the affirmative action area, and argues that the
1 The fourteenth amendment provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2 See infra notes 48-99, 102-116 and accompanying text for a discussion of the treatment of
affirmative action plans by the Supreme Court.
3 The provision was part of a collective bargaining agreement adopted on May 16, 1980. In this
provision the term "minorities" referred strictly to blacks. Britton v. South Bend Community School
Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1223, 1226 (1984).
4 Britton, 593 F. Supp. at 1223, 1224.
5 819 F.2d 766 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 288 (1987).
6 The court of appeals originally affirmed the district court's approval of the clause. Britton v.
South Bend Community School Corp., 775 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1985). After several subsequent
Supreme Court decisions concerning this issue, the appellate court granted a re-hearing en banc.
Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 783 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1986).
7 Britton, 819 F.2d at 772. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
CASE COMMENTS
court instead should have limited the applicability of its per se rule to
layoffs.
I. Britton v. South Bend Community School Corporation
In October, 1969, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) issued a letter listing five
areas where the OCR found evidence of discrimination by the South
Bend Community School Corporation (the "Corporation")." After a sec-
ond on-site review of the South Bend School District discovered no im-
provement, the OCR determined that the school corporation had not
complied with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9 InJuly, 1976, the
District of Columbia District Court granted an injunction directing HEW
to commence enforcement proceedings against the administrators of sev-
eral school districts not in compliance with Title VI, including the South
Bend Community School Corporation.10
Under pressure from HEW, the Corporation adopted Resolution
1020 in December, 1978, to alleviate the disparity between the percent-
age of black students attending its schools and the percentage of black
teachers it employed. At school board meetings prior-to adopting the
resolution, the disparity between black students and teachers was said to
reflect past employment discrimination by the Corporation. 1 When the
Corporation adopted the resolution, the distribution of blacks in the
community and of black students in the student body was twenty-two
percent while the percentage of black teachers was only ten percent. 12
The resolution provided for an increase in the percentage of black teach-
ers until it roughly equalled the percentage of black students. The
school board reasoned that proportional minority teacher representation
was necessary because teachers are important role models for students.13
As a result of this resolution, the percentage of black teachers employed
by the Corporation rose to thirteen percent of the teaching work force by
the 1981-82 academic year. 14
8 The two areas of concern relevant to the case were recruitment of minority teachers and pro-
motions for black and female teachers. Britton, 819 F.2d at 798.
9 Id. at 799. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982) provides: "No person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
10 Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215, 1222 (D.D.C. 1976). Public school students
brought this action through their parents against HEW for ignoring their statutory duty to enforce
equal rights in the area of public school education by continuing to actively supply segregated
schools with federal funds.
11 Britton, 775 F.2d at 800.
12 Id.
13 The resolution provided that "[t]o provide in-depth education, the schools need to provide in
the learning environment an opportunity for children to experience highly qualified representatives
of all ethnic groups and cultures as part of their education since they need to learn to function in a
pluralistic world." Resolution 1020 of the South Bend Community School Corporation, part I
(1978). The Seventh Circuit interpreted this to mean that " 'the Board specifically resolved to
increase the percentage of minority pupils [sic-the court meant "teachers"] because it deemed it
essential that the student population, both black and white, have a sufficient number of minority
teachers to act as role models.' " Britton, 819 F.2d at 767 (quoting Britton, 593 F. Supp. at 1225).
14 Britton, 593 F. Supp. at 1225.
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The teachers' union and the Corporation entered into a three year
collective bargaining agreement in May, 1980. The agreement stated
that, in the event of possible layoffs, "[n]o minority bargaining unit em-
ployee shall be laid off."1 5 The Corporation adopted this provision to
prevent the loss of gains made through its affirmative action plans in the
event of a possible reduction in the work force. 16 As a result, minority
teachers effectively had a higher level of seniority than nonminority
teachers. When layoffs occurred, in June, 1982, the Corporation re-
leased 188 teachers, all of them nonminorities, pursuant to the
agreement. 17
Several teachers affected by the no minority layoff provision filed
suit against the Corporation alleging violations of the fourteenth amend-
ment.' 8 The district court held that the layoff provision did not violate
the equal protection clause' 9 because there were adequate findings of
past discrimination to substantiate a claim of state interest and the Cor-
poration's plan was substantially related to achieving that interest.20 The
Seventh Circuit upheld the district court in a 2-1 decision. 21 In its evalu-
ation of the case, the district court had joined the equal protection claim
and the Title VII claim. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit evaluated the
two claims separately. Looking at the Title VII claim, the court applied
the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber 22 in determining that the corporation was a competent body to
find evidence of past discrimination and that the interests of the white
employees were not unnecessarily trammelled by the plan. 23
In evaluating the equal protection claim,24 the court determined that
remedying past discrimination is a substantial and important state inter-
15 Britton, 775 F.2d at 796 (quoting Article XXIII, Section 9 of the 1980-83 Agreement).
16 Id. at 796.
17 Id. at 797. The St.Joseph Circuit Court subsequently reduced the number of teachers laid off
to 146 under a consent order in South Bend Community School Corp. v. National Educ. Ass'n-South
Bend, No. N-7015 (St.Joseph Cir. Ct., approved Sept. 29, 1982). Id. (citing Britton, 593 F. Supp. at
1227 n.2).
18 Britton, 593 F. Supp. 1223 (1984). The teachers also claimed violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983 and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), the Indiana
Constitution and the Indiana Teacher Tenure Act, I.C. § 20-6.1-4-1, et seq. (1982). Id. The court
refused to hear the state claims. Britton, 593 F.2d at 1233.
19 Britton, 593 F.2d at 1232. The court determined that if the provision did not violate the equal
protection clause then it would not violate the federal statutes listed in the claim. Id. at 1229.
20 Id. at 1231, 1232. The court followed a two-prong test which had developed from earlier
opinions in Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 452 U.S.
938 (1981) and Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir.), modified in other respects, 712 F.2d
222 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). Britton, 593 F.2d at 1230. First, whether there
was some showing of past discrimination or underrepresentation which the state has an interest in
remedying. Second, whether the plan was substantially related to that interest. Id. at 1231.
21 Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 775 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1985).
22 443 U.S. 193 (1979). The court had already applied Weber to public employers injanowiak v.
City of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557, 562-63 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 107 S. Ct.
1620 (1987).
23 Britton, 775 F.2d at 803-807. The court said the plan was temporary, did not create an abso-
lute bar to nonminorities and was designed only to maintain hiring gains. Id. at 806, 807.
24 In evaluating the equal protection claim, the court recognized that the Supreme Court has not
provided any guidance in this area. The court did find two criteria that have been a foundation in
this area. First, the program must serve some governmental interest. Second, it must be somehow
directed toward reaching that objective. Britton, 775 F.2d at 809 (citation omitted). See also infra
notes 65-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of guidance in this area.
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est and that the findings of OCR were more than enough to establish
evidence of past discrimination. 25 In addition, the court viewed the plan
as not only "somehow directed" toward achieving that interest, but "es-
sential and crucial to the achievement of the affirmative action policies of
Resolution 1020," thereby satisfying scrutiny under any standard.26
Due to several intervening Supreme Court decisions affecting the
South Bend controversy, 27 the Seventh Circuit granted the teachers' mo-
tion for a re-hearing en banc.28 The court reversed and remanded the
case to the district court for a determination of the plaintiffs' damages.29
The plurality based its reversal on the Supreme Court's decision in Wy-
gant v. Jackson Board of Education.30 Because Wygant did not produce a
majority opinion,31 the plurality employed Justice O'Connor's opinion,
which had been decided on the narrowest grounds. 32 According to Jus-
tice O'Connor, the Wygant affirmative action layoff plan failed because it
was not narrowly tailored to achieve its asserted remedial purpose since
the provision was tied to an improper hiring goal.33 The Britton plurality
similarly argued that the South Bend layoff plan was not narrowly tai-
lored because it was tied to the same improper hiring goal as in Wygant.3 4
The plurality further argued that the Britton plan was unconstitu-
tional because it did not involve a compelling governmental interest.
The plurality found that the only purpose of the plan was to equalize the
percentage of minority teachers to the percentage of minority students in
order to supply role models. 35 The Wygant plurality rejected the use of
the role model justification as a compelling governmental interest.3 6
While concluding that remedying the effects of past discrimination
would have been a compelling governmental interest, Judge Posner,
writing for the plurality in Britton, found no evidence of past discrimina-
25 Id. at 809-11.
26 Id. at 812. In addition, the court found that the provision did not stigmatize any of the white
teachers who were laid off, did not require the retention of unqualified teachers, did not inviduously
trammel the interests of white teachers, and was a temporary measure. Id. at 812-13.
27 The Supreme Court decided five cases in the affirmative action area after the first appellate
decision: Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987); United States v. Paradise, 107 S.Ct.
1053 (1987); Local Number 93, International Ass'n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleve-
land, 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct.
3019 (1986); Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
28 Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 783 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1986).
29 Britton, 819 F.2d at 772.
30 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
31 The court issued a plurality opinion with two justices joining and one joining in part with two
justices joining, and concurrences by Justice O'Connor and Justice White. Justice Marshall, and
Justice Stevens all filed dissenting opinions. See infra note 71 for a discussion of the Wygant decision.
32 The court stated: " 'When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explain-
ing the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."'"
Britton, 819 F.2d at 768 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
33 Wygant, 106 S. Ct at 1857. Wygant's hiring goal was improper because it was tied to the per-
centage of minority students in the school distict, not to the percentage of minority teachers in the
labor pool and therefore bore no relation to the remedying of discrimination. Id.
34 Britton, 819 F.2d at 772.
35 Id. at 770-771.
36 Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1847, 1848.
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tion by the Corporation.37Although Judge Posner found no history of
past discrimination by the Corporation to justify the remedial plan, six
other judges for the Seventh Circuit en banc panel agreed with the lower
courts in finding a history of past discrimination by the Corporation.38
However, two of those six judges found the plan not narrowly tailored
and hence unconstitutional.3 9
A majority of the court agreed that the Corporation's plan was not
narrowly tailored and hence unconstitutional because the plan created an
"absolute preference." 40 By creating an absolute preference (the plan
required the layoff of all nonminorities before any minority could be laid
off) the plan unnecessarily trammelled the interests of nonminorities.
Judge Flaum, in his concurring opinion, hinted that if the Corporation
had adopted a proportional plan (a plan which divided layoffs of minori-
ties and nonminorities on a percentage basis) it would have passed judi-
cial scrutiny.41 According to Judge Flaum, the "fatal flaw" of the South
37 Britton, 819 F.2d at 771. In his analysis, Judge Posner differentiated between separation and
discrimination. The school corporation assigned blacks and whites to different schools. Judge Pos-
ner claimed this did not involve discrimintion in hiring but rather simply separated the blacks and
whites. In fact, Judge Posner claimed that because the schools were separated, more blacks were
hired to teach in the segregated schools. Therefore, he argued that instead of there being discrimi-
nation against blacks in hiring the result was to increase the number of blacks hired. Id. In addition,
Judge Posner stated that even if there was past hiring discrimination by the Corporation, that reme-
dial purpose was never asserted by the Corporaton and therefore could be considered waived. Id. at
771.
38 Id. at 772. (Flaum, J., joined by ChiefJudge Bauer, concurring in part; Cummings, J., joined
by judges Wood Jr., Cudahy, and Fairchild in dissent). Additionally, all of these judges argued that
there need not be a finding of past discrimination by the employer to justify an affirmative action
plan. Instead the question should be "whether the employer, giving due consideration to the rights
of all employees, had 'a firm basis for determining that affirmative action [was] warranted' (quoting
Wygant 106 S. Ct. at 1856 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part)), and whether it acted based on that
belief." Id. at 773. The concurring opinion and the dissenting opinions all expressed the view that
the Corporation did have a firm basis for determining that the affirmative action was warranted, thus
establishing a compelling remedial purpose. Judge Flaum hinted that other interests, such as pro-
viding faculty diversity, may also be compelling enough to justify affirmative action plans. Id. at 773
n.1. A determination that racial diversity among the faculty is a compelling state interest would
further undercut the part ofJudge Posner's argument that the plan did not invove a compelling state
interest. While Posner did not address that issue, Judge Flaum's position is tenable. In Wygant,
justice O'Connor did not preclude the possibility that a diverse faculty might be a compelling state
interest. She states:
The goal of providing "role-models" . . . should not be confused with the very different
goal of promoting racial diversity among the faculty. Because this latter goal was not urged
as such in support of the layoff provision before the Distict Court and the Court of Appeals,
however, I do not believe it necessary to discuss the magnitude of the interest or its applica-
bility in this case.
Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1854 n.*.
Further, Justice Marshall's dissent in Wygant espouses the view that the enhanced educational
quality resulting from a diverse faculty could supply the "[e]videntiary support for the conclusion
that remedial action is warranted." Id. at 1863 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens' dissent also fol-
lows this position where he concludes that special efforts to recruit and retain minorities have a
legitimate basis and are a sound educational purpose because an integrated faculty will be able to
provide benefits to the student body that could not be provided by an all white, or nearly all white,
faculty. Id. at 1868.
39 Judges Flaum and Bauer. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
40 Britton, 819 F.2d at 772 (emphasis in original) (plurality opinion). See also id. at 773 (Flaum,J.,
concurring in part). Judges Flaum and Bauer joined with the plurality opinion on this ground only.
See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
41 Id. at 773 (Flaum, J., concurring in part).
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Bend plan was that it "placed the entire burden [of alleviating past dis-
crimination] on the white teachers." 42
The dissents focused on two major issues. Judge Cummings di-
rected his attention to the absolute preference problem. He termed the
majority's distinction to be a per se approach, and argued that knocking
down a plan because it creates an absolute preference allows too much
manipulation by the court in order to reach the desired result.43 He
stated: "[T]he validity of an affirmitive action program will then depend
on how one chooses to define the benefits bestowed by that program."44
For example, if in Britton the plan was analyzed in light of the opportu-
nity for nonminorities to teach in South Bend schools it would not have
created an absolute preference for minorities because white teachers
were still allowed to teach in those schools. 45 However, when analyzed in
light of who would be laid off, the plan created an absolute preference
for retaining minorities. Judge Cummings stated that instead of finding a
per se violation, the court should "weigh the extent of the public em-
ployer's interest, the precise burdens imposed on innocent non-minori-
ties, and the adequacy of less onerous alternatives." 46
Judge Cudahy's dissent focused on the need for a remand for further
findings of fact. He felt that because recent Supreme Court affirmative
action decisions have changed affirmative action analysis, the Corpora-
tion could not have prepared a sufficient case. Judge Cudahy argued that
guidance on what type of plan would pass a constitutional challenge had
shifted constantly during the litigation period and had unfairly handi-
capped the corporation in its effort to adduce relevant evidence.47
Therefore, Judge Cudahy argued the interests ofjustice required that the
Corporation have an opportunity to present its case properly.
II. The Judicial Treatment of Public Affirmative Action Plans
Since their inception, public affirmative action programs have been
the subject of heated debate in both political and judicial contexts. 48
Although the Reagan administration has made the dismantling of public
affirmative action programs a priority,49 many argue that such programs
are necessary to realistically integrate fields previously closed to minori-
ties. 50 Courts have wrestled with the constitutionality of state affirmative
action programs in light of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
42 Id. (emphasis in original).
43 Id. at 777 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 776, 777.
45 Id. at 777.
46 Id. at 777. Judge Cummings suggested a remand to determine whether these factors were
met.
47 Id. at 785 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
48 See infra notes 49-50.
49 See, e.g., Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the D.C. Circuit, 114
F.R.D. 419 (1986). At the conference, William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Division of Civil Rights, asserted that "the Reagan Justice Department has stood firm
in the fight against quotas, numerical goals, set-asides, and similar arrangements that count by race,
sex, religion, or ethnic origin. They offend law and mock human dignity; they affirm nothing while
negating the most fundamental of constitutional principles: equal opportunity for all." Id. at 451.
50 As one scholar put it:
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amendment. 51 Although the Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth
amendment should function to eliminate racial distinctions,52 it has also
held that a governmental body may under some circumstances take race
into account as a factor in certain of its decisions,5 3 including the hiring,
promoting, and possibly even the laying off of its employees. Still, the
Court has ruled that any race-conscious decision must receive close ex-
amination to ensure that the fourteenth amendment's equal protection
guarantees remain unimpaired. 54
Imagine a hundred-yard dash in which one of the two runners has his legs shackled to-
gether. He has progressed ten yards, while the unshackled runner has gone fifty yards. At
that point the judges decide that the race is unfair. How do they rectify the situation? Do
they merely remove the shackles and allow the race to proceed? Then they could say that
'equal opportunity' now prevailed. But one of the runners would still be forty yards ahead
of the other. Would it not be the better part of justice to allow the previously shackled
runner to make up the forty yard gap, or to start the race all over again? That would be
affirmative action toward equality.
J. FOSTER & M. SEGERS, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: LIBERALISM, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
AMERICA 78 (1983) (quoting Rabb, Quotas by Any Other Name, COMMENTARY, Jan. 1972, at 4). See also
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 516 (1980) (Powell,J., concurring) ("The time cannot come too
soon when no governmental decision will be based upon immutable characteristics of pigmentation
or origin. But in our quest to achieve a society free from racial classification, we cannot ignore the
claims of those who still suffer from the effects of identifiable discrimination."); United States v.
Sheriden, 614 F. Supp. 387, 388 (D.N.J. 1985) (" 'Affirmative action plans, with all of their imperfec-
tions, deficiencies and weaknesses, are a symbol of this country's willingness to correct the inequities
of the past and to express a commitment to their elimination in the future.' ") (quoting Vulcan Pio-
neers, Inc. v. New Jersey Dept. of Civil Service, 588 F. Supp. 716, 727 (D.N.J. 1984)).
51 Affirmative action programs have also been challenged under various federal and state civil
rights statutes, particularly Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1982). InJohnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, California, 107 S.
Ct. 1442 (1987), the Court advised that the analyses under Title VII and the equal protection clause
are different since Title VII was enacted pursuant to the commerce clause, not the equal protection
clause. Id. at 1449-1450 n.5. However,Justice O'Connor advocated in Johnson that judicial examina-
tion of a public employer's affirmative action program under Title VII should be the same as that
required under the equal protection clause. Id. at 1461 (O'Connor, J., concurring). While the Court
has not clearly defined the analysis of affirmative action programs in light of the equal protection
clause, it has agreed on the factors to use in a Title VII analysis. In United Steelworkers of America
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979), the Court accepted an affirmative action plan in light of Title
VII because:
[T]he plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees. The plan does
not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees ....
Nor does the plan create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees ....
Moreover, the plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial balance,
but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.
The Court has adopted this reasoning in analyzing all Title VII challenges to affirmative action pro-
grams. See, e.g.,Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1451-1452.
52 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
307-308, 310 (1880)).
53 See, e.g., Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1850 (1986) (recognizing that it is
sometimes necessary to consider race to effectively eliminate the effects of prior discrimination);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 482 (1980) (In addressing a challenge to a race conscious Con-
gressional spending program, the Court held: "As a threshold matter, we reject the contention that
in the remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly 'color blind' fashion.").
54 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491.
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Traditionally, the Supreme Court has used varying degrees of scru-
tiny in equal protection challenges to governmental decisions in areas
other than affirmative action. Prior to the Burger Court, the Court had a
two-tiered standard of review for equal protection challenges posed to
governmental classifications. When a classification was based on eco-
nomic grounds or some other non-suspect5 5 category, the Court showed
great deference to the governmental body56 and applied a rational rela-
tionship test, rejecting the, decision only if the classification could not
conceivably bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose.57 When the classification was based on some "suspect"5 8 basis,
such as race, or infringed upon some fundamental right,59 the Court sub-
jected it to much more rigorous examination, often referred to as "strict
scrutiny." 60 Under strict scrutiny, the government needed to show that
the classification was necessary to achieve a compelling government in-
55 See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam) (Hold-
ing that age is not a suspect criteria, the Court found the State Police's mandatory retirement plan
constitutional.); see also infra note 58 (describing suspect categories).
56 New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam); Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S.
181, 185 (1976) (under this test, a court finds a governmental decision contrary to the fourteenth
amendment when it is "'clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise ofjudgment.' ")
(quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsrrrtrONAL LAW,
§ 16-2, at 995 (1978).
57 See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), where a pushcart vendor challenged a
New Orleans ordinance prohibiting pushcart sales in the French Quarter, but exempting those who
had operated there for more than eight years. The vendor bringing the suit had operated there for
only two years and argued that the exemption denied her equal protection. Id. at 298-299. The
Supreme Court upheld the ordinance, saying that the classification need only be "rationally related
to a legitimate state interest" because it was an economic regulation not involving a fundamental
right or a suspect criteria. Id. at 303. It found a legitimate state interest in the ordinance's goal of
enhancing the charm of the French Quarter. Id. Further, the Court said that "[S]tates are accorded
wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational dis-
tinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude." Id.
In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), welfare recipients challenged Maryland's admin-
istration of a welfare program because, though the state computed need based on family size, it said
the maximum amount a family of any size could receive was $250 a month. Id. at 474-475. The
recipients bringing the challenge were large families who argued that the program denied them
equal protection. Id. at 475. Since the case concerned "economics and social welfare," the Court
applied the rational relationsip test. Id. at 485. The Court said the plan need not be the wisest or
the most just, but merely rationally related to the legitimate goal of allocating limited resources
among a large group of potential recipients. Id. at 487. The Court found the plan constitutional.
Id.
58 In San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), the Court advised
that a suspect class is typically one which is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Typically, inherently
suspect classifications are those based on race, religion, or alienage. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
at 303.
59 See, e.g. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631 (1969) (the right to travel interstate is a
fundamental right) (citations omitted). But see Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306 (1981) (the freedom
to travel abroad is not a fundamental right) (citations omitted). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967) (the right to marry is a fundamental right) (citations omitted); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479,481-486 (1969) (the right to marital privacy is a fundamental right) (citations omitted);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-555 (1964) (the right to vote is a fundamental right) (citations
omitted).
60 See, e.g.,J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, CONSTrrtTIONAL LAw, § 14.3, at 530-531 (3d ed.
1986).
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terest.6 t Unsatisfied with the two-tiered approach, 6 2 the Court added a
middle tier, an intermediate test, initially to analyze gender classifica-
tions.63 Under this intermediate test, the Court requires that the classifi-
cation be "substantially related" to an "important government
interest." 64
However, in the affirmative action area, the Court has not yet de-
fined the appropriate standard of review. The Court first addressed the
constitutionality of affirmative action programs in Regents of University of
California v. Bakke. 6 5 Although a majority of the Justices in Bakke agreed
that affirmative action programs can be constitutional,6 6 they did not
agree on a standard of review. Justice Powell advocated strict scrutiny, 6 7
saying that the racial classification must be necessary to achieve a sub-
61 For example, in Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) the Court reversed a state court's
decision to deny a white mother custody of her daughter because of her remarriage to a black man.
The state court believed that if the child were to remain in the interracial household, she would
suffer because of societal discrimination against such living arrangements. Id. at 431 (citations omit-
ted). The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to the decision, since the classification was based on
race. Id. at 432 (citations omitted). The Court found that looking after the best interests of a child
in a custody dispute is a substantial governmental interest. Id. at 433. But, the Court concluded that
the possible effect of private biases on a child does not justify taking the child away from her natural
mother. Id. at 433.
In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court addressed the constitutionality of a Virginia
statute which prohibited interracial marriage. The Court subjected the racial classification to strict
scrutiny. Id. at 11. The Court found the statute unconstitutional since it did not involve a legitimate
governmental purpose as it was intended to "maintain White Supremacy." Id. at 11-12.
62 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (when strict scrutiny is applied, the statute is almost always found unconstitutional; when the
rational relationship test is applied, the statute is always upheld.); R. Fox, Equal Protection Analysis:
Laurence Tibe, The Middle Tier and the Role of the Court, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 525, 526 (1980) (arguing that
the two-tiered approach was too rigid).
63 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). An intermediate test has since been applied to
classifications based on illegitimacy as well. In Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978), the Court held that
while illegitimate children are not a suspect class and thus not subject to strict scrutiny, any classifica-
tion based on illegitimacy must be "substantially related to permissible state interests." Id. at 265.
The Court found a state statute requiring illegitimate children to provide a form proving paternity if
they are to inherit from their fathers by intestate succession constitutional. Id. at 275-276. The
Court found that the procedural requirement placed only on illegitimate children involved a legiti-
mate state interest in providing "for the just and orderly disposition of property at death," id. at 268,
and that the classification was substanially related to that goal. Id. at 275-276.
64 Id. at 197. In Craig, the Court addressed the constitutionality of an Oklahoma law which
provided that males could not purchase beer until they reached the age of 21, while females could
purchase beer once they reached the age of 18. Id. at 192. In finding the statute unconstitutional,
the Court found the state's interest in promoting traffic safety important, but that the gender based
classification did not clearly serve that interest. Id. at 199-200.
65 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978). Prior to Bakke, the Court had agreed to hear a constitutional chal-
lenge to an affirmative action plan, and then dismissed it without passing on the merits. DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (dismissed as moot).
Although constitutional claims were made, the Bakke Court found that the plan violated § 601 of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., which provides, inter alia, that no
person shall be excluded from participating in any program receiving federal financial assistance
because of race. But a majority of the Court did agree that the standards under Title VI and the
fourteenth amendments are the same. Id. at 287 (Powell, J.); id. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). The four other jus-
tices did not reach the issue of constitutionality, and instead decided the case solely on the basis of
Title VI. Id. at 408-421 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, CJ. and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
66 438 U.S. at 307-315 (Powell, J.); id. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
67 Id. at 291.
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stantial government interest.68 Justices Brennan, Marshall, White and
Blackmun advocated an intermediate standard, though not by name, and
said that the racial classification must be substantially related to achiev-
ing an important government interest.69
Since Bakke, the Court has addressed the constitutionality of affirma-
tive action programs, on the merits, on three separate occasions: in Fulli-
love v. Klutznick,70 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education,71 and United States v.
Paradise.72 The Court has come no closer than it did in Bakke, over ten
years ago, to reaching agreement on the appropriate standard of re-
view, 73 although strict scrutiny itself has been revised slightly by its advo-
cates.74 Furthermore, although some members of the Court have
recognized that hiring, promotional and layoff plans entail different de-
grees of intrusiveness to nonminorities, the Court has yet to decide
whether race conscious layoff plans are ever constitutional. 75
68 Id. at 305.
69 Id. at 359. However, Justice White's position on the standard of review is unclear, as he also
wrote a separate opinion, primarily to argue that Title VI does not provide for a private cause of
action. Id. at 379-387. Although Justice White wrote that "my views with respect to the equal pro-
tection issue, are included in the joint opinion that my Brothers Brennan, Marshall and Blackman
and I have filed," id. at 387, he wrote in a footnote that "I also join Parts I, III-A and V-C of Mr.
Justice Powell's opinion." Id. at 387 n.7. Part III-A ofJustice Powell's opinion contains part, though
not all, of his discussion of the standard of review. Furthermore, in subsequent decisions, Justice
White has notjoined either the intermediate standard advocates nor the strict scrutiny advocates and
has instead decided on a case by case basis without applying a specific standard of review. Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 453-492 (1980) (joining in opinion of Burger, C.J.); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1857 (1986) (concurring); United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053,
1080 (1987) (dissenting).
70 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of a congressional spending program
requiring that grantees of federal funds for work projects spend at least 10% of the funds on minor-
ity business enterprises)
71 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). The Court, by a vote of 5-4, found that a provision of a collective
bargaining agreement extending preferential protection against layoffs to minority school teachers
violated the fourteenth amendment. But the Court promulgated three opinions in support of the
judgment, and two dissenting opinions. Justice Powell's opinion, in which ChiefJustice Rehnquist
joined andJustice O'Connor joined in part, advocated using strict scrutiny to determine the consti-
tutionality of an affirmative action program. Id. at 1849. Justice Powell wrote that this plan failed
because the "role model theory" is not a compelling government interest, id. at 1847, and because
race-conscious layoffs are never constitional. Id. at 1849-1850. Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion accepted Justice Powell's use of strict scrutiny, but she refrained from deciding whether
race-conscious layoffs are always unconstitional. Id. at 1857. Justice O'Connor argued that the plan
was not narrowly tailored because it was tied to an improper hiring goal. Id. Justice White filed a
concurring opinion in which he refrained from articulating any standards, but he agreed withJustice
Powell that race conscious layoff plans are never appropriate. Id. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting
opinion in whichJustices Brennan and Blackmun joined. He wrote in favor of an intermediate test,
but argued that the layoff plan passed muster under any standard. Id- at 1861. Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion, not setting forth any standard of review, but arguing that the layoff plan was
constitutional. Id. at 1867-71.
72 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) (upholding an order that 50% of the promotions to Alabama State
Trooper Corporal go to blacks until 25% of the rank was composed of blacks).
73 See generally Friedman, Constitutional Equality and Affirmative Action in Employment: A Search for
Standards, 4 D'r. C.L. Rv. 1113 (1986) (discussing the Court's disagreement over the appropriate
standard of review).
74 Strict scrutiny advocates now argue that a plan should be narrowly tailored to achieve a com-
pelling governmental interest. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1846.
75 See supra note 71 (Wygant is the only Supreme Court case to have addressed the constitutional-
ity of affirmative action layoff plans).
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A. The Debate Over the Standard of Review: Strict Scrutiny
v. An Intermediate Test
Strict scrutiny advocates argue that since affirmative action programs
involve racial classifications which are always suspect, courts should ana-
lyze them under strict scrutiny. 76 Intermediate test advocates counter
that courts should not use strict scrutiny in affirmative action cases be-
cause affirmative action programs, which benefit minorities to the detri-
ment of nonminorities, do not involve a fundamental right and because
whites are not a suspect class. 77 At the same time they acknowledge that,
since a state can misuse any racial classification, the least critical rational
relationship test is also inappropriate. 78 In compromising between strict
scrutiny and the rational relationship test, they argue that the intermedi-
ate test is "strict - not 'strict in theory and fatal in fact,' because it is
stigma that causes fatality - but strict and searching nonetheless."' 79 In
any case, because the two standards are vague and their differences un-
clear, close examination of each is necessary to understand the affirma-
tive action controversy.
1. Governmental Purpose
Both strict scrutiny and the intermediate test require the govern-
ment to have some purpose in using racial classifications. Strict scrutiny
requires that purpose to be "compelling",80 while the intermediate test
requires it to be "important."''- Although some have said the differences
between the two are negligible, 82 requiring an important governmental
76 See, e.g., Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that strict scrutiny
"mirrors the standard we have consistently applied in examining racial classifications in other con-
texts."); Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (Powell, J.) ("Racial and
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and call for the most exacting judicial examina-
tion."); Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955, 965 (1974).
77 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part). But see id. at 295-296 (Powell, J.) ("[T]he white 'majority' itself
is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimina-
tion .... There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit 'heightened judicial
solicitude' and which would not."). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTUONAL LAW, at 91 (1979
Supplement); Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. CH. L. REV. 723, 727 (1974)
(" '[S]pecial scrutiny' is not appropriate when White people have decided to favor Black people at
the expense of White people .... [I]t is not 'suspect' in a constitutional sense for a majority, any
majority, to discriminate against itself."). But see Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Hgher Education: Polit-
ical Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 694 (1975) (In countering Ely, he ar-
gued: "American [political] majorities are rarely if ever monolithic. Typically, political majorities
are coalitions of minorities which have varying interests in the issue presented for decision.") (cita-
tion omitted).
78 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361.
79 Id. at 362 (quoting Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)). See also
Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
559, 578-579 (1975) (supporting an intermediate test for evaluating the constitutionality of "be-
nign" racial classifications).
80 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
81 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
82 ygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring); accordJones v. Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div., 642 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. Tenn. 1986); Friedman, supra note 73, at 1116-1117. But see
Greenawalt, The Unresolved Problems of Reverse Discrimination, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 106-107 (1979)
("[I]n the lore of constititutional law in the last two decades, 'compelling' has come to mean an
interest of such importance that when this requirement has been imposed few classifications have
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purpose appears to be more lenient than requiring a compelling govern-
mental purpose.
The most convincing governmental purpose for affirmative action is
to remedy the present effects of prior discrimination by a governmental
unit.8 3 This purpose has survived under both strict scrutiny and an inter-
mediate test.8 4 Also, at least with regard to higher education, a desire to
promote racial diversity among students has been accepted, even as a
compelling purpose.8 5
Those who require a compelling governmental interest have also
specified certain purposes which fall short of their standard. For exam-
ple, neither curing the effects of societal discrimination8 6 nor a "role
model"87 justification has been held to be compelling. However, curing
the effects of societal discrimination has been considered important.88 It
is unclear whether a role model justification would be considered
important.8 9
2. Means to Accomplish Purpose
Both strict scrutiny and the intermediate test require that the means
used be sufficiently tailored to meet a particular governmental purpose.
However, strict scrutiny now requires that those means be "narrowly tai-
lored" 90 while the intermediate test requires that the means be "substan-
tially related" 9' to the governmental purpose. The two standards of
survived. By asking only for 'important' interests, the Justices indicate that an interest of somewhat
lesser magnitude will suffice.").
83 See, e.g., Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853. ("[Whatever the [standard of review] employed, remedy-
ing past or present racial discrimination by a state actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to
warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program."); Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick, 448 U.S. 448, 497 (1980)(Powell, J., concurring) ("The Government does have a legitimate
interest in ameliorating the disabling effects of identified discrimination.") (citing Regents of Univ.
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)). The Court has also been in clear agreement that a
recipient of the benefits of a remedial affirmative action program need not have actually been a
victim of the discrimination. Wygant, 106 S. Ct at 1853 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84 Kromnick v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 739 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1107 (1985); Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981); Smith v.
Harvey, 648 F. Supp. 1103 (M.D. Fla. 1986); Youngblood v. Dalzell, 625 F. Supp. 30 (S.D. Ohio
1985), aff'd, 804 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. Cincinnati Firefighters Union, Local
No. 48 v. Youngblood, 107 S. Ct. 1576 (1987).
85 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-312 (Powell, J.).
86 Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848 ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis
for imposing a racially classified remedy."); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 358 (9th Cir.
1987);J.A. Croson Co. v. Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987).
87 The Sixth Circuit applied the role model theory in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d
1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986). The court found there was a need for
more minority faculty in order to mirror the percentage of minority students in the Jackson, Michi-
gan schools. The school board considered minority faculty members as role models for the minority
students. Reviewing the Sixth Circuit's opinion,Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, argued that
providing role models is not a compelling state interest. 106 S. Ct. at 1847. See also id. at 1854
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing withJustice Powell that the role model theory is not a compel-
ling state interest). See supra note 35-36 and accompanying text (role model theory in Britton).
88 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 328 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun,JJ.) (concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
89 In Wygant, rather than arguing that the "role model" theory is an important governmental
interest, the dissent did not address this issue and argued that the plan was justified because of prior
discrimination. 106 S. Ct. at 1862-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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review conflict more sharply under this prong than under the govern-
mental purpose prong92 because the Court construes "substantially re-
lated" more broadly than "narrowly tailored. '93
Justice Powell, advocating the narrowly tailored standard, has sug-
gested analyzing an affirmative action program in light of: (1) the availa-
bility of alternative remedies, 94 (2) the temporariness of the remedy, 95
(3) the relationship between the numeric goals of the program and the
percentage of minority group members in the relevant population or
work force,96 (4) the plan's flexibility if the goals cannot be met,97 and
(5) the impact of the plan on third parties. 98 Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Blackmun, who advocate the substantially related test, refrain from
analyzing affirmative action programs in light of any such factors.
Rather, they have argued that the only racial classifications which are un-
constitutional are those that stigmatize certain racial groups. 99 These
three Justices have never found an affirmative action program unconsti-
tutional under this standard.
Because members of the Supreme Court advocate such differing
standards for review of affirmative action programs, and are unable to
reach majority agreement on one standard or the other, the lower courts
have been in flux over what standard to apply and their decisions have
reflected this uncertainty. Since Wygant, most district and circuit courts
have adopted some form of strict scrutiny, apparently in rejection of the
amorphousness of an intermediate test. But some of these courts have
varied Justice Powell's guidelines. 00 Some circuits had adopted the in-
92 See Friedman, supra note 73, at 1117 ("[T]he determinative issue will be whether the particu-
lar form of affirmative action relief is adequately related to the accomplishment of that permissible
objective.") (citation omitted).
93 See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
94 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 510 (1980) (citing NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 619
(5th Cir. 1974); Vulcan Soc'y Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 398 (2d Cir. 1973)).
95 Id. (citing Vulcan Soc'y Inc. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 399 (2d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 414 n.1 2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973)).
96 Id. (citing Association Against Discrimination v. Bridgeport, 594 F.2d 306, 311 (2d Cir.
1979); Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1026-27 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 910 (1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333,
1341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 331 (8th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972)).
97 Id. at 511 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 18-19 (1st Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974)).
98 Id. at 514 (citing Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 374-375 (1977)).
99 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361. However, some lower courts which have adopted the intermediate test
have used factors to analyze affirmative action programs. See infra note 101.
100 The Ninth Circuit, in Associated Gen. Contractors of California v. City of San Francisco, 813
F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987) held that a city ordinance giving five percent bidding preference to minority
business enterprises violated the equal protection clause. The court considered "whether the city
had the authority to act... whether its findings [were] adequate ... whether the means it selected
[were] appropriate." Id. at 928. The court held "that state and local governments [can] act only to
correct their own past wrongdoing... " Id. at 930. It decided that the plan did not pass muster
under the equal protection clause primarily because of a lack of findings of past discrimination. Id.
at 931-932. With regard to the means, the court agreed that "[r]ace-conscious distinctions must be
narrowly tailored to eliminate the consequences of past discrimination." Id. at 934 (citations omit-
ted). The court defined narrowly tailored to mean that "the classification adopted must 'fit with
greater precision than any alternative means.' " Id. at 935 (quoting Iygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1850 n.6
(plurality opinion) (citing Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. CH. L. REv. 723, 727
[Vol. 63:102
CASE COMMENTS
termediate test prior to Wygant, and it is unclear what impact that case
will have on future decisions in those circuits. 10'
n.26 (1974))). Additionally, "the remedial program must not impose a disproportionate burden
upon few individuals." Id. at 935 (citing Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 173 (6th Cir.
1983). The court, however, applied the intermediate test in analyzing gender based classifications,
and upheld the constitutionality of a similar plan granting female-run business enterprises a bidding
preference. Id. at 942.
The District of Columbia Circuit, in Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir.
1987), addressed charges of reverse discrimination in police department promotions. When the
group promoted did not represent a racial mix reflective of the qualified racial mix in the relevant
population, the department added more promotion slots rather than change the group. The plaintiff
alleged discrimination when those slots went primarily to minorities. The court held that under both
Title VII and the equal protection clause, it must judge an affirmative action plan by "whether there
was an adequate factual predicate justifying the use of affirmative action... [and] whether the em-
ployer's plan unnecessarily trammels the legitimate interests of nonminority or male employees."
Id. at 1301. In light of Wygant, the court held that the equal protection clause requires a greater
"quantum of evidence [than Title VII] ... to demonstrate that the plan was adopted for a remedial
purpose." Id. at 1303. The court held that the plan at issue passed muster under Title VII, but
remanded the case for further fact finding as to the adequacy of the Department's remedial justifica-
tion since the trial court did not have the benefit of Wygant. Id. at 1306-1307. The court noted that
since the narrowly tailored prong was the same for both a Title VII and constitutional analysis, the
court on remand did not have to address whether the means were appropriate. The only question
remanded was whether there was an adequate basis for believing that the situation needed affirma-
tive action. Id. at 1306.
In Smith v. Harvey, 648 F. Supp. 1103 (M.D. Fla. 1986), the court stated that "the Supreme
Court has required that affirmative action plans challenged on equal protection grounds pass strict
scrutiny by showing that a plan is justified by a compelling governmental interest and that the means
chosen are narrowly tailored .... " Id. at 1107 (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448). But see supra notes 65-
73 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court has not agreed on the appropriate standards).
The court then correctly acknowledged that the Court has "not agreed on the specific inquiries that
a court should make in determining the validity of such plans." Id. at 1107. It then adopted the
following factors as appropriate in analyzing whether an affirmative action plan passes strict scrutiny:
1. Did [the] authority or governmental body that implemented the plan have the authority
to do so?
2. Has there been a competent finding of past discrimination that presently affects the
targeted work force?
3. Does the plan roughly approximate, but not unreasonably exceed, the minority balance
that would have been achieved in the applicable work force without past discrimination?
4. Does the plan operate to hire or promote only qualified applicants?
5. Does the plan unnecessarily trammel the interests of [nonminorities] and is it otherwise
narrowly tailored?
6. Is the plan temporary and will it terminate once the targeted imbalances have been
eliminated?
Id. at 1109.
101 See, e.g., Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 885 (6th Cir.), modified in other respects, 712
F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). The court held in Bratton that "[a]bsent
an opinion joined by a majority of the Supreme Court, or an en banc decision of this Court, we are
unpersuaded that the [intermediate test] ... is no longer the law of this Circuit." Id. at 886. But see
Long v. City of Saginaw, No. 85-1352 (6th Cir. October 20, 1986) (WESTLAW, CTA 6 library). In
addressing a collective bargaining agreement modification permitting the hiring of one minority
police officer for every officer recalled from layoff status, the court remanded the case for a hearing
in light of the Wygant decision. The court did not indicate that it had changed its standards in light
of Wygant, but remanded because the district court had relied on the Sixth Circuit opinion in that
case. It seems unlikely that the Sixth Circuit will change its standard because of tygant since the
Wygant Court did not reach majority agreement.
See also Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981) where the
court upheld the constitutionality of Arkansas State University's affirmative action hiring program
which called for hiring 25% minorities over a four year period to achieve a five percent minority
employment goal. The court held that for an affirmative action plan to be constitutional there must
be a finding of past discrimination and the plan must be substantially related to remedying that
discrimination. Id. at 508-510. But the court defined the substantially related standard more nar-
rowly than Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun, moving it closer to the narrowly tailored stan-
dard. Id. at 510.
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B. Employment Affirmative Action Plans: A Continuum
Although the Supreme Court has not agreed to the appropriate stan-
dard of review in equal protection challenges to public affirmative action
plans, various members of the Court and other legal scholars have recog-
nized that different types of employment affirmative action plans infringe
upon nonminorities' rights in different degrees. Generally the least in-
trusive plans involve hiring, the most intrusive involve layoffs, and those
involving promotions lie somewhere in the middle, with the ultimate de-
cision of the constitutionality of each dependent upon the circumstances
of the case.102
1. Hiring Plans
Affirmative action hiring plans are favored in fields or positions
which had previously been closed to minorities. Generally hiring plans
do not impose as great a burden on nonminorities as promotion and lay-
off plans. Hiring plans merely deny the nonminority a future employ-
ment opportunity rather than take away an existing job. 0 3 At least
theoretically, the nonminority should have other employment opportuni-
ties available.' 0 4 Furthermore, the burden on nonminorities arising from
such a plan is diffused among society as a whole instead of being placed
on specific individuals or those already employed. 10 5
2. Promotion Plans
While hiring plans enable minorities to enter fields previously closed
to them, affirmative action promotion plans encourage employers to ele-
vate minority employees to positions they had not before attained. At
least one commentator has said promotion plans burden nonminorities
slightly more than hiring plans because employees generally put more
time and energy into earning a promotion than into getting thejob in the
first place. 10 6 Also, the burden is not diffused among society as a whole,
102 See supra notes 103-116 and accompanying text.
103 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842, 1851 (Powell, J., plurality).
One article has said:
The incumbent white in a layoff context seeks to enforce an explicit or implicit contractual
right that he has earned with his labor. Having invested his energies and his aspirations in a
firm, he feels .. entitled to the security that seniority is designed to provide. Quite differ-
ent is the situation of the first-time job applicant. He has no individual right to have the
selection made in accordance with any particular set of criteria. . . . [T]he unsuccessful
applicant for a new job suffers essentially the same loss as anyone else who fails to get a
desired position ....
Fallon & Weiler, Firefighters v. Stotts: Conflicting Models of RacialJustice, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 66.
104 Wygant 106 S. Ct. at 1851.
105 Id.
106 Comment, Equal Protection and Affirmative Action injobPromotions: A Prospective Analysis of United
States v. Paradise, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 205, 236 (1986).
But see Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1987), which provided:
[P]romotion guidelines visit a minor burden on nonminority employees. But unlike hiring
goals, promotion guidelines do not require that an individual bear the burden of past dis-
crimination to the extent that he or she is denied a livelihood. All of the City's employees
who are denied promotion retain their existing jobs, salary, and seniority.
Id. at 360.
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but instead is borne by the present employees denied promotions.'0 7
Furthermore, promotion plans, like layoff plans, upset seniority systems
which are valued by employers and employees alike.' 08 Still, promotion
plans merely delay opportunity for nonminorities, rather than deny it en-
tirely as is the case with layoffs. 109 Courts have upheld numerous public
affirmative action promotional plans, particularly when the employers
had discriminated in offering promotions in the past." 0
3. Layoff Plans
Many public employers use race conscious layoff plans to maintain
gains made through affirmative action hiring and promotion plans during
economic downswings. But many argue that layoff plans burden nonmi-
norities too much by actually taking jobs and seniority away from
them."' The burden is not diffused among society as a whole, but is
107 In Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1851,Justice Powell wrote that "[w]hile hiring goals impose a diffuse
burden, often foreclosing only one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of
achieving racial equality on particular individuals .... " The same comparison can be made between
hiring and promotional goals, since those employees who are denied promotions, like those who are
laid off, are specifically burdened by the plan.
108 See infra note 11 (discussing the importance of seniority systems).
109 Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1851 (Powell, J., plurality).
110 See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) (upholding an affirmative action
promotion plan in light of particularly egregious past discrimination by the employer); Higgins v.
City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1987); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir.),
modified in other respects, 712 F.2d 222 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Youngblood v. Dal-
zell, 625 F. Supp. 30 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aft'd, 804 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub noma.
Cincinnati Firefighters Union, Local No. 48 v. Youngblood, 107 S. Ct. 1576) (1987).
See also Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to
Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1598, 1605-06 (1969):
An employee's seniority "expectation" of particular promotions is merely a hope .
Moreover, it is settled that seniority rights are not vested property rights and that seniority
rules can be altered to the detriment of any employee or group of employees by a good
faith agreement between the company and the union .... Furthermore, in the case of
formerly white-only seniority units, the promotional expectancies of incumbent whites vis-
a-vis new black employees are expectancies of future additional benefits from the past dis-
crimination.... [E]ven where the workers have had no part in the discrimination, their
accumulated expectancies are to some extent illegitimate. Were it not for the prior exclu-
sion of black workers, an incumbent white employee might not even have obtained employ-
ment, much less acquired substantial promotional expectancies.
But see Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Powell countered the above Coopers & Sobol quote:
Such reasoning is badly flawed. Absent some showing of collusion, the incumbent em-
ployee was not a party to the discrimination by the employer. Acceptance of the job when
offered hardly makes one an accessory to a discriminatory failure to hire someone else.
Moreover, the incumbent's expectancy does not result from discrimination against others,
but is based on his own efforts and satisfactory performance.
Id. at 789 n.7.
111 See Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1851 (Powell, J., plurality); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 706
F.2d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 1983) (vacating a district court order which nullified the seniority rights of
school teachers to prevent erasing the gains made in minority hiring. The court stressed the impor-
tance of seniority rights and the expectations employees have in them.). See generally Franks v. Bow-
man 424 U.S. 747, 766-67 (1976) (discussing the importance of seniority); Fallon & Weiler, supra
note 103 (also stressing the importance of security):
Senority is the glue that holds together this mutually beneficial arrangement for stable ca-
reer employment. To the worker, seniority guarantees that his employer, having obtained
the benefit of a higher performance/compensation ratio during the early years of employ-
ment, will not replace its older employees when that ratio becomes unfavorable. At the
same time, a strong commitment to seniority serves the long-run interest of employers, by
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instead borne by those particular individuals who must give up their
jobs. 112 Some argue that although race conscious hiring and promotion
plans are permissible under the appropriate circumstances, race con-
scious layoff plans are per se unconstitutional.' 3 Others insist that with-
out race conscious layoff plans, recessions would erase all gains made in
minority employment through affirmative action hiring programs be-
cause minorities recently hired through such programs would be the first
employees laid off." 4 Although the Supreme Court held a specific race
conscious layoff plan unconstitutional in Wygant, 1 5 it left open the ques-
tion of whether or not race conscious layoff plans are ever
constitutional." 16
III. Formulating A Guide For Future Affirmative Action Programs
It is clear that the Supreme Court has had difficulty articulating a
clear standard of review in the affirmative action area. That Wygant has
five diverse opinions" 17 pointedly illustrates that "agreement upon a
means for applying the equal protection clause to an affirmative-action
program has eluded th[e] Court every time the issue has come before
[it.]"118 In Britton, Judge Posner applied strict scrutiny. 19  Strict scru-
allowing them to make credible promises of de facto tenure to their newer employees in
order to obtain their consent to an overall compensation package.
Id. at 57. See also Fischer, Seniority is Healthy, 27 LAB. L.J. 497 (1976) (stressing the importance of
seniority and the dangers of disturbing seniority systems with racial quotas).
112 Wygant, 106 S. Ct at 1851 (Powell, J., plurality).
113 Id.; see also id. at 1857 (White, J., concurring) (while affirmative action hiring plans can be
legitimate, race conscious layoff plans are unconstitutional); Chance v. Bd. of Examiners, 534 F.2d
993, 998 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Council of Supervisors & Adm'rs v. Chance, 434 U.S. 881
(1977).
114 Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1858 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I, too, believe that layoffs are unfair.
But unfairness ought not be confused with constitutional injury .... [A] public employer ... should
be permitted to preserve the benefits of a legitimate and constitutional affirmative-action hiring plan
even while reducing its work force ...."); see also Tangren v. Wackenhut Services, Inc., 480 F. Supp.
539 (D. Nev. 1979) (upholding a seniority override provision in a collective bargaining agreement
under Title VII in order to eliminate the remains of past discrimination), aff'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982); Behman, The Affirmative Action Position, 27 LAB. LJ. 490,
491 (1976) (seniority systems left intact will effectively prevent recently hired minorities from ob-
taining job security. Still, seniority systems are necessary to the work place and should be revised
carefully.); Elkiss, Modifying Seniority Systems Which Perpetuate Past Discrimination, 31 LAB. L.J. 37 (1980)
(employers and unions must revise seniority systems to preserve gains made in minority
employment).
115 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
116 See supra note 71 (by promulgating five opinions in Wygant, the Court did not reach a majority
opinion as to the appropriate standard of review for such programs or whether race conscious layoff
plans are always unconstitutional).
The Court also addressed an affirmative action layoff plan in Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). But, in Stotts, the plan was challenged under Title VII, not under the
equal protection clause. Therefore, Stotts provides no instruction on the constitutionality of race-
conscious layoff plans. Furthermore, the plan in Stotts involved a court ordered plan in that the
district court enjoined the Memphis Fire Department from using its seniority system to determine
layoffs since doing so would result in many more blacks than whites being laid off. Id. at 567. The
Court did not address the appropriateness of race-conscious remedies, and instead reasoned that the
district court had exceeded its powers. Id. at 573-83.
117 See supra note 71.
118 Wygant, 106 S.Ct. at 1861 (Marshall,J, dissenting).
119 See supra notes 76-101 and accompanying text (discussing the debate over the appropriate
standard of review).
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tiny is a more appropriate standard of review than intermediate scrutiny
in this area because it provides the most thoughtful examination of
whether or not a nonminority's rights have been violated by an affirma-
tive action plan. As Justice Marshall, an advocate of the intermediate
test, has said, even a benign racial classification is subject to misuse.1 20
Courts should analyze affirmative action programs to ensure that benign
racial classifications do not disparage the interests of nonminorities. The
intermediate test does not analyze a plan to see if it detracts from the
interests of nonminorities.
In its application of strict scrutiny, the Britton plurality concluded
that the plan's improper hiring goal violated the equal protection clause.
The plurality found that the plan did not involve a compelling govern-
mental interest because it was based on a role model theory rather than
on past discrimination.1 21It is difficult to understand the plurality's char-
acterization of the facts. Their insistence that the facts did not demon-
strate remediable prejudice and that the plan was based solely on a role
model theory appears to be an attempt to mold this case to Wygant. Ac-
tually, as the dissent pointed out, HEW, which conducted the on-site in-
spections of the South Bend School District, had determined that there
was a history of recruitment, hiring, and promotion discrimination. 122
The Britton plurality ignored these findings. To require more extensive
findings of discrimination before school districts can take voluntary ac-
tions to eliminate that discrimination unduly burdens local
governments. 123
The court further ruled that a plan that gives an absolute preference
to every black over every white failed the "narrowly tailored" prong as a
matter of law.' 24 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit has created a per se
rule for evaluating affirmative action plans under the equal protection
clause. What other opinions have mentioned as one factor to weigh in
determining whether a plan is narrowly tailored 25 can now be the deter-
mining factor that a court considers. With this standard the Seventh Cir-
cuit has set itself apart from other courts. 126 Such a standard may seem
drastic when interpreted in light of particularly egregious past discrimi-
nation; however, affirmative action plans can make inroads toward reme-
dying egregious situations without resorting to layoff provisions with
absolute preferences and their inherent hardships.
120 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121 Britton, 819 F.2d at 770.
122 Id. at 780 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
123 Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1855.
124 If Judge Posner did not include this second ground for reversal, the case would have pro-
duced no majority opinion because Judge Flaum's concurrence agreed only with this second objec-
tion to the plan. 819 F.2d at 772. See also supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
125 Johnson v. Trans. Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1455 (1987) (upheld
taking sex into account in promoting a female over a male with higher test scores); United States v.
Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1073 (1987) (approved a one to one promotion ratio); Local 28 of Sheet
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3052 (1986) (upheld a 29% nonwhite member-
ship goal for the union); ygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1865 (Marshall, J. dissenting); United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (approved one to one admittance to job training program).
126 See supra notes 100-10 1 and accompanying text for standards used in other courts.
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The Britton court applied its per se rule too broadly. Although a per
se approach may be desirable in certain limited situations, courts should
use a totality of circumstances approach in evaluating most affirmative
action plans. A court should apply a per se rule only in the presence of
an absolute preference plan concerning layoffs. 1 27 As this Comment has
discussed, layoff plans are fundamentally different from hiring and pro-
motion plans. 128 Layoff plans which create an absolute preference place
an extreme burden on fionminorities due to the inordinate hardship of
layoff plans as opposed to hiring and promotion plans. Inevitably, this
inherent hardship will lead to a violation of the equal protection
clause. 129
A plan that creates an absolute preference will severely burden the
nonminorities involved. Such a burden plays an important role in ana-
lyzing hiring and firing plans, but applies most compellingly to layoff
plans, where hardship is most acute. In Britton five judges recognized
that the nature of an absolute preference plan makes it unconstitu-
tional,' 30 but left open the possibility that a proportional layoff plan
127 It has been suggested that layoffs should never be used in affirmative action. See Wygant, 106
S. Ct. at 1851-1852 (Powell, J.) (a layoff plan centers the burden on the nonminority, making them
bear too intrusive of a burden and as long as hiring goals could make headway into alleviating per-
ceived discrimination, layoffs are inappropriate); id. at 1857, 1858, (White, J., concurring)
("Whatever the legitimate hiring goals or quotas may be, the discharge of white teachers to make
room for blacks, none of which have been a victim of any racial discrimination is" analogous to firing
whites and replacing them with blacks); Liggett, Recent Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisions and a
Re-examination of the Weber Case, 38 LAB. L.J. 415 (July 1987) (courts should not interfere with seniority
rights in order to protect new hires); Note, Alternatives To Seniority Based Layoffs: Reconciling Teamsters,
Weber, and The Goal Of Equal Employment Opportunity, 15 U. MIcH.J. L. REF. 523, 540-543 (1982) (the
harshness of a layoff plan trammels interests of nonminority employees and replaces nonminorities
with minorities); Burke and Chase, Solving The SeniorityMinority Layoffs Conflict: An Employer-Targeted
Approach, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 81, 90-95 (1978) (layoff plans place the burden on the nonmi-
nority when it should be placed on the wrongdoer: the employer).
128 See supra notes 102-116 and accompanying text.
129 The Eighth Circuit has recognized that absolute preferences in hiring and promoting plans
also place a great burden on nonminorities. In Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972), the
district court attempted to remedy discrimination in hiring at the Minneapolis Fire Department by
ordering that the next twenty hires be minorities. Id. at 318. The court said this absolute preference
"does appear to violate the constitutional right of Equal Protection of the Law to white persons who
are superiorly qualified." Id. at 328. In order to accommodate the conflicting considerations of the
rights of nonminorities and of remedying discrimination, the court changed the plan to a one to one
hiring provision until the department attained the goal of twenty minority firefighters. Id. at 330.
The Eighth Circuit again followed this reasoning in United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 479 F.2d
354 (8th Cir. 1973), when it disregarded the government's request that the remedy for discrimina-
tion by an employer in promoting workers required that the first fifteen vacancies be filled by minori-
ties. It adopted instead a plan of one to one promotions until the employer met its goal. Id. at 377.
The consideration of infringement on nonminorities that makes absolute preference creation a nega-
tive factor in affirmative action hiring and promotion cases is all the more compelling for layoffs.
130 Judges Posner, Coffey, Easterbrook, Flaum, and Bauer recognized the per se unconstitution-
ality of an absolute preference plan. 819 F.2d at 772-773. But see id. at 777 (Cummings, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Cummings there rejected per se unconstitutionality of absolute preference, because
courts could manipulate this rule to produce any desired result by making any plan seem absolute.
Yet, Judge Cummings here goes too far. While it may be difficult in general to characterize affirma-
tive action plans, in most instances it is possible to determine if a plan creates an absolute prefer-
ence. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. Plans that say of the next twenty hires none can
be white (Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972)) or of the teachers to be laid offall must
be white clearly show that whites have no chance of getting or maintaining the job. If the judge
remains unsure whether the plan creates an absolute preference he can simply look to the totality of
the circumstances, using the absolute nature of the plan as a factor. However, when a layoff plan
clearly creates an absolute preference a per se violation is unavoidable.
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might be constitutional.131 While three justices rejected a proportional
layoff plan in Wygant,13 2 the majority felt either that the plan was nar-
rowly tailored or refused to consider that aspect of the case and decided
on other grounds.13 3 Thus, it appears that courts might accept some lay-
off plans.
Courts should not accept affirmative action layoff plans that include
an absolute preference. This bright line test is not an attempt to curb
legitimate affirmative action plans, but is a recognition of the hardships
inherent in layoff plans. This test is premised upon a basic observation
of the discrimination against nonminority rights in Britton and other ab-
solute preference cases: that layoff plans represent a separate class in af-
firmative action analysis and should be treated differently.
In all other affirmative action cases which do not involve an absolute
preference layoff plan, a court should adopt strict scrutiny and analyze a
public affirmative action program in light of the factors enumerated in
Fulilove v. Klutznick 134 to see if the program is narrowly tailored to meet
the governmental purposes. The court should examine the totality of the
circumstances, letting no single factor control. The court should balance
the burden of a given plan on minorities 3 5 against the temporariness of
the plan,' 36 the relationship of the numeric goals to the relevant labor
market,13 7 and whether the goals set forth in the plan can be waived if
they cannot be met realistically. 138 Then the court should compare such
plans to other available plans.' 3 9 By doing so, the court insures that the
plan " 'fit[s]' with greater precision" than any other plan. 140 Moreover, if
courts would employ such factors, local governments would have clearer
131 Judgle Flaum noted in his concurrence that "[i]f the board had reasonably believed that the
only means to remedy its past discrimination was by continuing to increase the percentage of black
teachers, it could conceivably have been permissible for it to adopt a proportional layoff plan." 819
F.2d at 773.
132 106 S. Ct. at 1852 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, CJ., and Rehnquist, J.).
133 Id. at 1865 (Marshall, J., dissenting joined by Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J.,); Id. at 1870
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 1857 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment). In
Arthur v. Nyguist, 712 F.2d 816 (2d Cir. 1983), the court affirmed a proportional layoff plan to
remedy adjudicated discrimination in the Buffalo school system and considered the plan narrowly
tailored.
134 448 U.S. 448 (1980). See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
135 The very nature of affirmative action programs is such that some burden will fall on nonmi-
norities. The question, therefore, is not whether the plan imposes a burden, but to what degree.
Justice Powell stated that "[a]s part of this Nation's dedication to eradicating racial discrimination,
innocent parties may be called upon to bear some of the burden of the remedy." Wygant, 106 S. Ct.
at 1850. The burden should not be "too intrusive." Id. at 1852. Furthermore, the burden should
be "diffused to a considerable extent among society generally" rather than imposed on particular
individuals only. Id. at 1851.
136 As stated in United States v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers Int'l Union, Local 46, 471 F.2d
408, 414 n.12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973), "Et]he limited duration ... demonstrates
that preference is to be used only as is necessary to remedy past discrimination."
137 See supra note 96.
138 See, e.g. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 514 (waiver provision necessary to give a governmental body
flexibility if, for example, there are not enough qualified minority members to meet a particular
hiring goal).
139 For example, in Wygant Justice Powell considered the availability of hiring goals to meet the
same purpose as layoffs. He argued that since hiring goals are "less intrusive," they are the better
alternative to layoffs. 106 S. Ct. at 1852.
140 Id. at 1850 n. 6 (citing Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 723, 727 n. 26 (1974)).
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guidance in formulating affirmative action plans that would withstand ju-
dicial scrutiny and litigants would be able to effectively prepare and ar-
gue their cases.
V. Conclusion
Britton is the first case in the Seventh Circuit to interpret the
Supreme Court's decision in Wygant concerning layoff plans. Although
Britton helps to clarify the court's stance on affirmative action layoff plans,
no clear guidance is offered. Similarly, the Supreme Court has yet to
establish any clear analytical framework to give direction in this area.
Without sufficient guidance the courts cannot expect litigants to argue
their cases efficiently. In addition, public employers find it difficult to
frame affirmative action layoff plans that they can be confident will pass
judicial scrutiny.
In Britton, the Seventh Circuit bypassed an opportunity to provide
concise guidance in the affirmative action area. An overly broad applica-
tion of a per se rule presents many difficulties. A more appropriate anal-
ysis would limit the per se rule solely to affirmative action layoff plans
involving absolute preferences. In all other instances, courts should ex-
amine the totality of the circumstances.
Mary C. Burson
Jay W Schlosser
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